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Abstract
“At this time of extreme challenges, we must not abandon the responsibility to
protect or leave it in a state of suspended animation, finely articulated in words
but breached time and again in practice.”
António Guterres, 2018.1

Since the 1990s, the international community has utilized a growing range of measures
to protect populations from mass atrocities, war crimes, genocides and crimes against
humanity; however, the numbers of victims, casualties and human losses are increasing daily
all over the world. The international community is still unable to protect civilians most in
need and those under real threat, even while applying the principle of the humanitarian
intervention.
The international response to the crisis in Libya during its popular uprising in 2011 was
remarkably quick and decisive; the UNSC endorsed for the first time in history a resolution
(1973) to authorize the international intervention in another state, to protect civilians under
threat, without the approval of its government; in this regards, the adoption of such resolution
was declared a turning point in the history of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect.
The principle of humanitarian intervention has always been a debatable issue; while
most studies focus on the dilemma of its legality, ethics, morality, types and intervening
actors, this research focuses on evaluating its outcome and analyzing the factors contributed
to its success/failure, while using Libya as a case study.
After the intervention in Libya, the country has been characterized by state collapse,
anarchy and chaos, and the intervention was considered a failure to the international
community and to the principle of the responsibility to protect. In this regards, this research
argues that the intervention of the international community in Libya was responsible for the
intensification of the sufferings, deterioration and threats facing the civilians in Libya post the
1

UN Secretary-General's remarks to the General Assembly debate on the responsibility to protect on 25 June 2018.
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intervention stage. While clarifying that the abuse of the international intervention and the
fragility of the Libyan state are the main factors behind the collapse of Libya. In addition, this
research draws lessons for the future of the principle.
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I. Introduction
The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and
decisive; where in many other cases of mass atrocity crimes, the international community has
failed to generate timely and sufficient political will to protect civilians at risk.2The reaction
in the case of Libya has been more explicitly connected to the principle of the responsibility
to protect (R2P) than any other crisis before.3 To illustrate, as part of the Arab Spring, a
popular uprising erupted against the president of Libya in February 2011; after few days from
the outbreak of the popular uprising in Tunisia and Egypt. During the early days of the
popular uprising, the Libyan regime “launched a brutal crackdown and pro-Qaddafi forces
started to push eastward, threatening the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. Fearing a bloodbath,
the international community responded swiftly”4in order to save the innocent lives in Libya,
as just one week after the Libyan security forces had begun to violently suppress protests on
15 February 2011, the United Nations Security Council issued a press statement that called
on the Libyan government “to meet its responsibility to protect its population;” 5
Then, within weeks of the conflict escalating, the United Nations Security Council
adopted resolution 1970 followed by the adoption of resolution 1973. Both resolutions were
unusually quick and decisive; they referred the situation in Libya to the International
Criminal Court, created an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, authorized the use of force,
and created a no-fly zone over Libya.6 In addition, resolution 1973, which was adopted on
March 17, required all necessary measures to be taken to protect civilians in Libya. 7As such

2

Dunne, Tim, and Jess Gifkins. “Libya and the State of Intervention.” Australian Journal of International Affairs. October 19, 2011.
https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/10357718.2011.613148?needAccess=true.
3
Brockmeier, Sarah, Oliver Stuenke, and Marcos Tourinho. “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection.” Global
Society. November 5, 2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029.
4
Dunne, Tim, and Jess Gifkins. “Libya and the State of Intervention.” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 2011.
<http://www.uq.edu.au/isaasiapacific/con tent/GifkinsDunne.pdf>.
5
Brockmeier, Sarah, Oliver Stuenke, and Marcos Tourinho. “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection.” Global
Society. November 5, 2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029.
6
“Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour
with
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https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.
7
Dunne, Tim, and Jess Gifkins. “Libya and the State of Intervention.” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 2011.
<http://www.uq.edu.au/isaasiapacific/content/GifkinsDunne.pdf>.
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within two days from the adoption of the resolution, France led coalition launched air and
missile strikes against the Libyan forces, then later on, the responsibility for what was called
Operation Unified Protector was quickly transferred to NATO. “In policing the arms
embargo and patrolling the no-fly zone over Libya through aerial attacks on pro-Qaddafi
forces and military equipment, NATO’s intervention helped to tip the balance in the conflict
in favour of the Libyan opposition”8. By early October 2011, the Libyan National
Transitional Council (NTC), the anti- Qaddafi group which was established on 27 February
2011, had secured control over the entire country and rebels had captured and killed Al
Qaddafi. In turn, the international community put an end to the Operation Unified Protector
on 31 October 2011.
Later on, the international community decided to have a role in helping the Libyans
building up their country by providing assistance through the United Nations Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). To illustrate, after six months from the beginning of the armed
conflict in the Libya, the United Nations in September 2011 established a political mission to
support the country’s new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. The Security
Council has settled certain target to the UNSMIL including helping restoring the public
security, promoting the rule of law, and assisting the Libyan authorities in strengthening
human rights,9 and since then the United Nations has been keen to renew and extend the
mandate of the mission frequently; while aiming to help in ending the ongoing instability and
chaos that the Libyans are suffering from since 2011.
In this context, it cannot be denied that the intervention in Libya represents a turning
point in the humanitarian intervention debate regarding the responsibility of the international

8

Dunne, Tim, and Jess Gifkins. “Libya and the State of Intervention.” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 2011.
<http://www.uq.edu.au/isaasiapacific/content/GifkinsDunne.pdf>.
9
Dembinski, Matthias, and Theresa Reinold. “Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect – African and European Perspectives.”
2011. <http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/369284305.pdf>.
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community to intervene in a sovereign state to protect civilians from mass atrocities. 10The
use of coercive measures against a state, such as sanctions and referrals to the International
Criminal Court, has been proven to be controversial in the United Nations Security Council;
however, the use of force has been the most controversial tool in the debates on R2P and the
protection of civilians since the beginning.11Significantly, resolution 1973 marked the first
time the Security Council authorized the non-consensual use of force for the protection of
civilians against a functioning state,12since the principle by the UN at the 2005 World
Summit was endorsed. Libya raised questions that had already been debated during the
intervention in Kosovo and discussed in much details in the 2001 report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which first proposed the
principle of R2P: what should be the role of force in protecting populations from atrocity
crimes? 13As such, the adoption of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution
1973, the authorization of the use of coercive measures to protect civilians and “the ensuing
of the military intervention in Libya have been widely hailed as events of historic
importance.”14
Furthermore, according to the director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect, the intervention in Libya represents “a key turning point in the history of R2P” 15
, the
debates changed from a “battle around ideas to a battle around implementation”16
. To
explain, the transitional setting in Libya was a moment of enthusiasm and hopes inside the
country. The rebuilding of the state was considered a crucial task with lots of expectations

1

0
Gifkins, Jess. “R2P in the UN
Security Council : Darfur, Libya and beyond.” Cooperation and Conflict. 2015.
http://journals.sagepub.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010836715613365.
1
1
Brockmeier, Sarah, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marcos Tourinho. “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection.”
Global Society. November 05, 2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029.
1
2
Gifkins, Jess. “R2P in the UN
Security Council : Darfur, Libya and beyond.” Cooperation and Conflict. 2015.
http://journals.sagepub.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010836715613365.
1
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Brockmeier, Sarah, Oliver Stuenkel,
and Marcos Tourinho. “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection.”
Global Society. November 05, 2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029.
1
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“Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect – African and European Perspectives.”
2011. <http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/369284305.pdf>.
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and Marcos Tourinho. “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection.”
Global Society. November 05, 2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029.
1
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Global Society. November 05, 2015. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029.
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attached to it17
; however, few years later, Libya has been characterized by state collapse,
anarchy and chaos, with conflict between ever-changing alliances of armed groups, terrorism
with the expansion of the Islamic State and uncontrolled borders with waves of migrants
crossing the Libyan desert northward then from Libyan shores toward Europe.18
Such deteriorations led to debates regarding the intervention, as a principle, and its
outcome and whether it is a real tool of protection to the civilians under threat or its results
may increase their harmfulness. The majority of the literature on humanitarian intervention
focuses on the dilemma and debates regarding the ethics, legality, types of intervention,
intervening actors; however, there is less focus on the dilemma of the outcome of the
intervention. This research aims to evaluate the consequences of the intervention, while
having Libya as a case study, in order to figure out whether the intervention in Libya is
considered successful or not; in addition to focusing on determining the factors behind the
deteriorating situation in Libya and if it is a result of the intervention itself, or there are other
factors that lead to the current situation.
Research Question:
Using Libya as a case study, this thesis is trying to answer to the following questions:
1. To what extent is the international community committed to protect the civilians in
the humanitarian crises?
2. Evaluate and analyze the factors contributed to the success/failure of the international
intervention, while drawing lessons for the future of intervention.
These two questions will be divided into the following sub questions: What are the factors
that compel the international community to intervene in the humanitarian crises? Are these
standards applicable to the case of Libya? As compared to many other humanitarian crises,
1

7
Droz-Vincent, Philippe. “Competitive
Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently a Specific Setting or Deconstructing Its Weak Sovereign
State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?” Small Wars & Insurgencies. May 11, 2018. https://www-tandfonlinecom.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2018.1455322?needAccess=true.
1
8
Droz-Vincent, Philippe. “Competitive
Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently a Specific Setting or Deconstructing Its Weak Sovereign
State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?” Small Wars & Insurgencies. May 11, 2018. https://www-tandfonlinecom.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2018.1455322?needAccess=true.
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why did the international community decide to intervene in Libya after only two months from
the outbreak of the popular uprising? What are the standards of an effective intervention?
Hypothesis:
This thesis is arguing that the abuse of the humanitarian intervention and the fragility
of the Libyan state are the main factors behind the collapse of Libya.
There are many factors that can explain the current collapse of Libya; one of which is
the abuse of the humanitarian intervention; as the military intervention has exceeded its
objectives in many different ways. It took actions that were inconsistent with its main target
of protecting the civilians in Libya, by engaging in the process of fostering regime change. In
addition, the fragility of the Libyan state is the other factor that has led to the intensification
of the current deteriorated situation and the collapse of the state. To explain, before the
popular uprising, all the institutions used to be under the control and influence of Al Qaddafi,
and his regime, so that when he felt, the state had to be re-built from scratch. Consequently,
Libya is now lacking the functioning state structure, and this led the country to face a high
level of instability, unable to control the armed militias that are committing human rights
violations and hindering the efforts of rebuilding the country.
In spite of the international efforts to protect the civilians in Libya and to help the
country in its democratic transition, Libya has been “overrun by militias and is facing an
intensified human rights violations, mounting chaos that is infecting other countries, growing
internal splits, and even about to reach a failed state.”19Thus, this study aims to figure out the
effect of the intervention on the current situation in Libya while arguing that there are many
international and domestic factors that negatively affect the success of the intervention in
Libya, and led to the collapse of Libya.
This research is divided into four chapters, in addition to the introduction. The first

1

Jones, Owen. “Libya is a disaster we 9helped create. The west must take responsibility.” 2014.
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/24/libya-disaster-shames-western-interventionists>.
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chapter gives a brief overview of the principle of the humanitarian intervention, and how it
has been developed throughout history, the dilemma of its ethical and legal perspectives; in
addition to highlighting the different tools of intervention. The international intervention as a
principle has been promoted by Liberalism; therefore, this chapter also clarifies how the
liberal theorists perceive the principle of the humanitarian intervention and their arguments
for it as well as the criticism directed against it. Chapter 3 focuses on Libya as a case study
for the international intervention; while starting with giving an overview on the situation in
Libya before and during the 2011 popular uprising, then refer to the response of the
international community towards the situation in Libya at that time and its intervention to
protect the civilians under threat. Then, chapter 4 focuses on the situation in Libya post the
2011 intervention while evaluating the outcome of the international community intervention
in 2011 and the reasons behind the deterioration of the situation in Libya since that time.
Finally, the conclusion evaluates the role of the international community in protecting
civilians under threat while drawing lessons for the future of the humanitarian intervention.

12

Chapter II
Literature Review
This chapter gives a brief overview on the principle of the humanitarian intervention,
starting by its definition, the emergence of the principle and how it has been developed
throughout history, then this section will refer to the dilemma of the principle of the
humanitarian intervention while focusing on the debates regarding its morality and legality,
as they are considered the main dilemma in all debates regarding this principle. In addition,
this section will highlight the different tools used by the international community when
intervening in the targeted state, as such intervention can be through the diplomatic channels,
economic sanctions or by using the military forces. International intervention as a principle
has been promoted by Liberalism, as such the second section of this chapter clarifies how the
liberalists perceive the principle of the humanitarian intervention and their arguments for it as
well as the criticism directed against it.
The Conceptual Framework:
2.1 What is meant by the Humanitarian Intervention?
J.L.Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as the “use of force across state
borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave
violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own, without the
permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”20While clarifying that “they
are: non-forcible interventions such as the threat or use of economic, diplomatic, or other
sanctions; and forcible interventions aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening state’s
own nationals. 21

2

Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert O. 0Keohane. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
2
Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert O. 1Keohane. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. United Kingdom:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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Adam Roberts stated that the humanitarian intervention is a “military intervention in a
state, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread
suffering or death among the inhabitants.”22According to Martha Finnermore, “humanitarian
intervention is a military intervention with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of
foreign civilians.”23Bhikhu Parekh believes that, “humanitarian intervention is an act of
intervention in the internal affairs of another country with the view to ending the physical
suffering caused by the disintegrations or gross misuse of authority of the state, helping
create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.”24Furthermore, D.
J. B. Trim and Brendan Simms stated that “since the nineteenth century, has been termed
‘humanitarian intervention,’ that is, action by governments (or, more rarely, by organizations)
to prevent or to stop governments, organizations, or factions in a foreign state from violently
oppressing, persecuting, or otherwise abusing the human rights of people within that state.”25
Thus, although there is no exact definition for humanitarian intervention, it was
agreed that it reflects the use of force with the aim of helping the non-nationals; for the sake
of preventing the gross of violations of human rights on behalf of people other than their own
nationals, through the use of armed force.26In other words it is “the use of military force to
protect foreign populations from mass atrocities or gross human rights abuses”27

2

2
Kardas, Saban. “Humanitarian Intervention:
The evolution of the idea and Practice.” Journal Of International Affairs. Volume VI. Number
2 (June - July 2001): <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SabanKardas2.pdf>.
2
3
Kardas, Saban. “Humanitarian Intervention:
The evolution of the idea and Practice.” Journal Of International Affairs. Volume VI. Number
2 (June - July 2001): <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SabanKardas2.pdf>.
2
4
Kardas, Saban. “Humanitarian Intervention: The evolution of the idea and Practice.” Journal Of International Affairs. Volume VI. Number
2 (June - July 2001): <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SabanKardas2.pdf>.
2
5
Humanitarian Intervention : A History,
edited by Brendan Simms, and D. J. B. Trim, Cambridge University Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook
Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aucegypt/detail.action?docID=691897.
2
6
Kardas, Saban. “Humanitarian Intervention:
The evolution of the idea and Practice.” Journal Of International Affairs. Volume VI. Number
2 (June - July 2001): <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SabanKardas2.pdf>.
2
7
Waxman, Mathew. “Is humanitarian
military intervention against international law, or are there exceptions?.” Council on Foreign
Relations. N.p., 27 Jun 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/international-law/humanitarian-military-intervention-against-international-law-thereexceptions/p31017>.
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2.2 The Emergence/ development of the principle of Humanitarian Intervention
“The birth of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is associated with natural law
and early international law.”28The early discussions of the principle of humanitarian
intervention can be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth century classical writers on
international law, particularly in their discussions on just wars. As Philosopher Jurist and
scholar Hugo Grotius mooted the principle of right to use force on humanitarian ground in
the seventeenth century. Thereafter number of interventions took place till date. 29
To illustrate, “The father of international law Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) aspired to
regulate international relations by introducing new political and moral standards, among other
provisions concerning respect for sovereignty and contracted agreements.30In order to
promote international order; he further refined the “just war” doctrine stressing that wars
were only allowed if based on specific legal reason. In his opinion a right to popular uprising
existed, in extreme cases of tyranny, for the subjects of a prince. 31
The states are entitled to exercise the right vested in human society on behalf of
oppressed individuals. “The Grotian formulation allows the full-scale use of force to end
human suffering. There has been a strong Grotian tradition in international relations and this
idea is represented today by writers such as Vincent, Lillich and Lauterpacht. Throughout the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, philosophers of political liberalism, such as Mill, related
the principle of humanitarian intervention to the concept of human rights.” 32
Apart from these intellectual precursors, the modern principle of humanitarian
intervention is generally associated with state practices in the nineteenth century, when states

2

The Danish Institute of International8 Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects. Copenhagen: Nordisk Bog Center,
2000.
2

The Danish Institute of International9 Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects. Copenhagen: Nordisk Bog Center,
2000.
3
The Danish Institute of International0 Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects. Copenhagen: Nordisk Bog Center,
2000.
3
The Danish Institute of International1 Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects. Copenhagen: Nordisk Bog Center,
2000.
3
The Danish Institute of International2 Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects. Copenhagen: Nordisk Bog Center,
2000.

15

started to invoke humanitarian reasons to justify their interventions. “The well-cited cases
were generally directed against the Ottoman Empire for the protection of Christians, such as
the Greek War for Independence, Lebanon-Syria, the Bulgarian Agitation and Armenia.”33
Since the end of the Second World War, an international effort has been undertaken to
protect civilians in armed conflict and prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. In 1948 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
was adopted by the United Nations and entered into force three years later. “The Convention
was the steppingstone in the international community’s attempt to ensure the horrors
witnessed during the Holocaust would never occur again. However, the resounding promise
of “Never Again” would prove to be hollow”.34
By the end of the Cold War, discussion on human rights and its promotion at the
international level has proliferated. The emerging international system and the global wave of
democratization have enabled human rights groups to exert more pressure and persuasion on
liberal states and international organizations to take up the promotion of human rights.
Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the emerging international system were characterized
by the increasing possibilities for international cooperation among major powers.35
To illustrate, a singular development of the post-Cold War era is the use of military
force to protect human beings. Throughout history, humanitarian intervention has occurred in
a number of instances in the post-Cold War. “Some of the more significant interventions, of
quite varying natures are: the establishment of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq in
1991 to protect, respectively, the Kurdish refugees and the Marsh Arabs; Bosnia-Herzegovina
(1992-95); Somalia (1992); Cambodia (1994); Rwanda (1994); Haiti (1994) by a U.S.

3
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Kardas, Saban. “Humanitarian Intervention:
The evolution of the idea and Practice.” Journal Of International Affairs. Volume VI. Number
2 (June - July 2001): <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SabanKardas2.pdf>.
3
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intervention force; Albania (1997) by an Italian intervention force; Kosovo (1998-99); Sierra
Leone (1999); East Timor (1999), etc.”36
Following the mentioned tragedies of the 1990s, especially those that took place in
Rwanda and the Balkans, the international community began to seriously debate on how to
react effectively when “citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematically violated.”37
These events raise the question of the responsibility of the international community when
states are neither able nor willing to protect their own populations. The question at the heart
of such matter was whether the states have unconditional sovereignty over their interests and
affairs or the international community has the right to intervene in another country for
humanitarian purposes.38In this regards, according to Christina Gabriela Badescu, despite
extensive consideration, “no consensus was reached on the principles governing humanitarian
intervention.”39To its proponents, intervention simply signals the imperative of action in the
face of mass violence and is intertwined with a perception of sovereignty as conditional to a
state’s respect for the human rights of its citizens. To its detractors, humanitarian intervention
is an oxymoron that serves as a pretext for selective military intervention without legal
sanctions and an exercise that only achieves uncertain results. Badescu clarified that
throughout the 1990s controversy resigned- particularly over Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and
Kosovo, between supporters of a right of humanitarian intervention and those who argued
that state sovereignty precluded any intervention in the internal matters of a state where
egregious human rights violation took place.40
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At the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in 1999, Kofi Annan, the Former UN
Secretary General, challenged member states to prevent having another Rwanda and to reach
consensus on the issue of humanitarian intervention. This moment was soon dubbed by
commentators as the trigger for the search to produce a new perspective framework for the
contentious humanitarian intervention debate. The response to this question was the creation
of the principle of the responsibility to protect,41while mentioning that state sovereignty is
not only a privilege but also a responsibility.
The international community declared its responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as according to the
outcome of the 2005 UN World Summit outcome, which was adopted by the UN general
assembly on 16 September 2005:
138. “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement,
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate,
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability”. 42
139. “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a
timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council , in accordance with
4
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the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications,
bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also
intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before
crises and conflicts break out.” 43
140. “We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the SecretaryGeneral on the Prevention of Genocide.”44
Furthermore, according to the report of the security general, adopted in 2009, on the
implementation of the responsibility to protect there are three pillars to the process of R2P.
Pillar I: the protection and responsibility of the State; Pillar II: International assistance and
capacity building, and Pillar III: Timely and decisive response.45To explain, according to
Lesley Connolly, Pillar I here refers to a state’s responsibility to protect its population and
country from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Pillar II is
the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting the obligations of
protection of its people from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It seeks to
draw on the cooperation of member states, regional and sub-regional arrangements, civil
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society and the private sector, as well as on the institutional strengths and comparative
advantages of the UN system. Prevention, building on pillars one and two, is a key ingredient
for a successful strategy for the responsibility to protect. Pillar III refers to a situation where a
state has failed to protect its citizens from mass atrocity and peaceful measures are not
working. When this happens, the international community has the responsibility to intervene
at first through diplomacy, and then through coercive means but only use military force as a
last resort. 46
In this regards, John Holme stated that “the third pillar of R2P is after all often seen as
the practical manifestation of an older idea of humanitarian intervention, given much
attention after the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica, the international community must
never again standby and watch atrocities take place without acting to stop them.”47
2.3 The Dilemma of the Humanitarian Intervention:
The principle of the humanitarian intervention raises several questions at several levels;
however, the main dilemma in all debates focuses on the ethics and legality of this concept.
2.3.1 Ethics (Human rights Vs. state sovereignty)
In his Millennium Report of 2000, the Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
recalled the failures of the Security Council to act in a decisive manner in Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, and put forward a challenge to Member States: “If humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a
Rwanda, to Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every
precept of our common humanity?”48Annan’s much cited quotation encompasses the central
dilemma of the humanitarian intervention debate, namely the challenge of reconciling norms
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in international law: sovereignty and human rights.
Humanitarian intervention has been considered a controversial issue, as many debates
between different schools of thought on whether or not the states have the right to intervene
in the affairs of the other states in cases of massive violation of human rights; many questions
have been raised regarding the ethics of intervention in the humanitarian crises. Some
scholars believe that humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme human rights abuse is at
the very least morally permissible; others believe that some cases of extreme human rights
abuse create a moral duty to intervene to stop the abuse.49Thus, the principle and practice of
humanitarian intervention presents a seemingly insurmountable dilemma in global
governance: this dilemma is characterized by the tension between two fundamental principles
of international law: on the one hand, the prohibition of the use of force as it penetrate the
sovereignty of the states, while other is the obligation to respect and protect human rights.
According to Iain Atack, “Chomsky points out, this conflict is embodied in the two main
pillars of international law and international order, the UN Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UD): There is at least a tension, if not an outright
contradiction, between the rules of world order laid down in the Charter and the rights
articulated in the UD..The Charter bans force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees
the rights of individuals against oppressive states...The issue of humanitarian intervention
arises from this tension.”50
Iain Atack argued that the “Armed humanitarian intervention, or the use of military
force to protect the fundamental human rights of the citizens of another state, has become
increasingly prominent in debates about the role of ethics in international affairs.”51
“Questions concerning the violation of state sovereignty and the use of armed force, in
4

9
Crovelli, Mark R. “Humanitarian Intervention
and the State .”University of Colorado, Boulder.
<http://mises.org/journals/scholar/crovelli2.pdf>.
5
0
Atack, Iain. “Ethical Objections to Humanitarian
Intervention.” Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002): 279-92.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26298080.
5
1
Atack, Iain. “Ethical Objections to Humanitarian Intervention.” Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002): 279-92.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26298080.

21

particular, have been central to debates about the morality of humanitarian intervention.”52
Ethical objections to such intervention focus on two issues in particular: the violation of
national sovereignty and the use of armed force with the concomitant loss of life and human
suffering entailed.”53
The definition of humanitarian intervention contains two main elements: one
purporting to grant a certain number of rights and privileges based on humanitarian principles
or human rights; while the other specifying the nature and limits of state sovereignty. In other
words, the question of the ethical status of humanitarian intervention arises from the conflict
of two traditions of thought, state sovereignty and human rights.
But before going into such dilemma, we have to know first what is meant by
Sovereignty. The sovereignty of states is the foundation of interstate relations for the past
several centuries. It is also the basis of the modern world order. “But the idea of sovereignty
traces back to ancient Rome where was formulated as the power of the Emperor and to XVI
century when Jean Bodin defines the sovereign as a ruler subjected only to the natural law,
divine law and the law of nations”. 54Sovereignty is “the most high, absolute and perpetual
power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonweal...the greatest power to command.”55
Hugo Grotius defined sovereignty as “power whose acts are not subject to the control
of another, so that they may be made void by the act of any other human will.”56Thomas
Hobbes “regarded sovereignty as absolute, unified, inalienable, based upon a voluntary but
irrevocable contract” 57According to the number of international law researchers, the concept
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of state sovereignty was established in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 which ended
almost three decades of war in Europe and indicated new order, based on the national
sovereignty. The Peace of Westphalia “did not sanction the right of rulers to do whatever they
pleased within their own territories”58
As the idea of the final and absolute authority in the state, the concept of sovereignty
is recognized in the United Nations Charter as one of the main principles of international law.
The principle of the sovereign equality of all states is adopted in art. 2(1) of the UN Charter.
The prohibition of interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states by other sovereign
states, especially of the threat of use of force lays down in art. 2(4). In order to promote the
sovereignty of states UN Charter in art. 2(7) stipulates that “nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter.”59
The proponents of the humanitarian intervention believe that the concept of
humanitarian intervention is at its core about protecting people. “It rests on the premise that
when gross abuses of human rights are taking place, when innocent people are being maimed
and killed, then the international community cannot and should not stand idly by.”

60

This is

because the major responsibility of states, governments, and the international community is to
protect and secure human rights, the rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood
alone. In addition, Mark Crovelli argued that the “Governments and others in power who
seriously violate those rights undermine the one reason that justifies their political power, and
thus should not be protected by international law.”61Furthermore, “State Sovereignty entails
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responsibility, and therefore each State has a responsibility to protect its citizens from mass
killings and other gross violations of their rights. If that State is unable or unwilling to carry
out that function, the state abrogates its sovereignty and the responsibility to protect falls to
the international community.”62
On the other hand, opponents of the concept of humanitarian intervention believe that
the humanitarian intervention erodes the principle of sovereignty, which has been
successfully governing the world since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. They argue that
respecting the sovereignty of the other states is a fundamental principle in international
relations; in which the norm of non-intervention is enshrined in Article 2.7 of the UN
Charter. According to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty “A sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and
total jurisdiction within its territorial borders. Other states have the corresponding duty not to
intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state
has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence.”63In other
words, sovereignty gives states the legal right to manage their internal affairs free from
outside interference and prevents powerful states intervening in weaker states; even if such
intervention is for the protection of the civilians, as it is considered a kind of intervention in
the internal affairs of the state; which is against the principle of sovereignty. Boberic Dragana
stated that “while P5 states purport to be in favour of territorial integrity and sovereignty of
states, the reality is at times starkly different; humanitarian intervention has been cited as a
valid reason to suspend the associated rights of state sovereignty, as the example of NATO
intervention in Kosovo clearly highlights. Operations Allied Force proceeded on 24 March
1999 without any explicit, or implicit, Security Council authorization, leading to
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condemnation by the Russian Federation of aggression against a sovereign states, which was
undertaken in violation of the United Nations Charter in circumvention of the Security
Council.”64
2.3.2 The Legal Status of the Humanitarian Intervention According to the UN charter
The intervention of the international community in the states is a controversial issue, for
some politicians argue that it should not be allowed as it penetrate the sovereignty of the
states while others are encouraging it in order to save the civilians. But the question now is
how the United Nations perceives the concept of humanitarian intervention. The United
Nations Charter is widely seen as fundamentally non-interventionist in its approach. Taken as
a whole the Charter essentially limits the right of states to use force internationally to cases
of, first, individual or collective self-defence, and second, assistance in UN-authorized or
controlled military operations. Nowhere does the Charter address directly the question of
humanitarian intervention, whether under UN auspices or by states acting independently.
However, the Charter does set forth a number of purposes and rules, which are germane to
humanitarian intervention.65
A. Unauthorized Intervention
Since the Second World War, the international law has prohibited states from threatening
or using force except in self-defence or pursuant to Security Council authorization.66In other
words, if humanitarian intervention is not authorized by the Security Council, its status under
the Charter is considerably more dubious.67The strongest and most frequently cited
prohibitions on intervention are those in Article 2. To illustrate, article 2(4) states that ‘All
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Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”68
Thus, this article reflect that the use of force in international relations is totally prohibited,
with only two exceptions: (1) as authorized by the Security Council , and (2) in exercise of
the right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter69which stated that “Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”70
Also relevant to the legality of humanitarian intervention is Article 2(3) of the
Charter, which states that “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.”71The requirement that disputes be settled so that justice is not endangered may
leave some room for unauthorized humanitarian intervention under Article 2(3). At the very
least, however, force could not be the first resort; there would have to be a genuine attempt to
achieve a peaceful resolution in order to comply with Article 2(3).72
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B. Authorized Intervention
As mentioned before the UN charter oppose the military intervention in the internal
affairs of the other countries, even if it is for protecting the civilians; however, it may be
allowed in the sever threats, with the permission of the Security Council. To explain, the
Security Council has the authority, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to conduct or
authorize humanitarian intervention. The keystone of the Security Council’s authority is
Article 39 of the Charter, which states that “The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.73Thus, The language of Article 39
expressly gives the Security Council the authority to determine what is a threat to the peace;
and in turn decide whether to authorize military intervention or not.
2.4 Debate over the tools of Intervention:
The form of intervention that could constitute part of the global arsenal in seeking the
protection of civilians is always a debatable issue, as there are different forms of intervention:
A. Diplomatic Intervention:
Raphael Soubeyran stated that it is a non-coercive, non-violent and ultimately nonbinding form of intervention. “It is a voluntary process where a third party helps antagonists
to define and sign a peaceful agreement.”74Diplomatic interventions normally precede other
forms of intervention and aim at either averting violent escalation of a conflict or establishing
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conditions conducive to de-escalation.75In addition, Patrick Regan argues that diplomatic
interventions can shorten the time of conflict, unlike the military or economic interventions,
which could increase the expected duration of a conflict.76However, Stefan Wolff argued
that other scholars believe that the failure of diplomatic efforts to change the behavior of
conflict parties on the ground often leads to either more coercive measures applied to both
parties or selective coercion and/or support for individual parties77
B. Economic Intervention:
The states can intervene in the internal affairs of another state by imposing economic
sanctions. It is considered punitive measures taken by one or more states against another state
that have violated international law, or which poses a threat to national or international
security.78In addition, the economic sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare
of a target state by reducing international trade or imposing any kind of economic pressure in
order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior.79
C. Military Intervention:
Is the last solution for the international community; it is the use of force by states or
organization against another state with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of the
foreign civilians and to prevent the gross of violations of human rights. But can the military
intervention help in promoting democracy and protecting human rights. According to
Mohammed Nuruzzaman “foreign military intervention to promote democracy and human
rights in the targeted states is a hotly debated issue. There are two camps of scholars who
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hold diametrically opposed views on the linkages between military interventions, democracy
and human rights promotions.”80He clarified that “Scholars in the pro-intervention camp
vigorously argue that military interventions are necessary to unseat autocratic regimes, save
the lives of people who aspire for democracy and promote human rights of the oppressed
peoples. Interventions, according to them, are the best and most effective ways to
democratize the authoritarian states and societies.” 81According to Nuruzzaman “the antiintervention camp, in contrast, rules out any positive connections between interventions and
human rights and democracy promotions on the ground that third-party interventions are
harmful to domestic reconciliation process and peace building in the target states. 82
The Theoretical Framework:
2.5 Liberalism and humanitarian intervention:
Liberal theorists believe that “(1) individual rights hold primacy over national
interests and sovereignty; (2) the natural state of man is peaceful; (3) the application of
reason can resolve conflicts of interest among individuals and states; (4) human nature is
malleable and improvable; (5) human society is progressively improving; (6) norms are more
important than power; (7) international institutions are effective means of promoting
harmony; and (8) military force should only be used in pursuit of altruistic objectives”. 83
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According to Michael J Smith, traditionally liberalism valued self-determination,
community, and shared history.84 Liberalism also has a “more universalist conception of
human rights in which sovereignty is a subsidiary and a conditional value” 85
. Under such a
framework, humanitarian intervention would clearly reflect moral and legal principles.
Indeed, states who commit genocide or other egregious human rights abuses break nearly all
known moral codes and forfeit, according to liberalism, their legitimacy and the right to
govern their own states free from intervention. Furthermore, Terry Nardin suggests that the
non-intervention principle inherently accounts for exceptions made to it: since “a state exists
to protect the rights of its citizens, if it violates those rights it loses its moral rationale and
therefore its immunity from foreign interference”86
. Thus, liberal theorists appear to agree
that the main purpose of humanitarian military interventions is the preservation of human
security.87
The liberalists believe that the major role of states and governments is to protect and
secure human rights.88The liberal cosmopolitan support of humanitarian intervention consists
of three assumptions: people have equal rights and freedoms which institutions exist to
protect, all people equally possess these rights and freedoms regardless of culture, religion,
state, etc., and finally, the protection of these rights is a concern for all individuals, states,
national and international organization.89
In this regards, it is worth to refer to the commitment of the international community
to protect the civilians under threat. To explain, protecting civilians under threat is an
obligation, not a choice; as the international community is committed to respond to mass
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atrocity crimes or serious human rights violations to protect civilians under threat. There is an
international norm that civilians in war-affected situations should be protected from violence.
This norm has grown particularly strong since the end of the 1990s when there was a clear
shift in the global security agenda, putting the issue of protection of civilians at the forefront
of the responsibilities of the international community.90As such the international community
has a humanitarian responsibility to intervene, even military, in order to protect vulnerable
individuals from violent threats. 91In this context, the humanitarian intervention is seen as a
justified mechanism to respond to large-scale injustices associated with human rights
violations and as a method of law enforcement by the international community. 92As such, the
liberal concept of humanitarian intervention will be employed throughout the thesis to
evaluate the intervention in Libya.
It is important to note that the liberal principle of humanitarian intervention was
criticized by those who believe that so called humanitarian interventions are always guided
by real political interests and can never be purely moral in nature. Those realists are hostile to
any intervention said to be motivated by ethical reasons. As Smith puts it, states are “unable
to act in other than self-interested ways”.93
As the case of Libya will reveal, facing the threats of refugee flows, oil, and
terrorism, the international intervention decision was driven by perceived threat to
intervening states national interest. As applied to the international intervention in Libya,
realism suggests that states are “likely to intervene when the potential target of intervention
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poses a direct or potential threat to their national interest (defined as territorial integrity or
citizens), their economy or a natural resource of major economic or security significance.” 94
As Lisa Anderson argues on Libya “For a century, international powers have believed
that the territories we now know as Libya could be turned to their purposes in the absence of
clear norms and standards for statehood and sovereignty.... Today, local politics reflect the
obvious conclusion: in the absence of integration into a stable international system,
interventionist impulses by outside powers serve not to induce social change or development
but only to sustain local political powerbrokers and fuel local political competition.”95
The realists refer to national self-interests as being the primary motives of intervening
states.96Hans Morgenthau believes that “interest is the perennial standard by which political
action must be judged and directed”97
; and therefore, the “objectives of a foreign policy must
be defined in terms of the national interest”.98In addition, realists agree that there is no
reason to believe that when a state decides to get engaged in evolving humanitarian
catastrophes abroad, facing significant risks, assuming high costs and compromising national
resources; it does so for reasons other than self-interest.99Thus, the realists are against the
concept of humanitarian intervention, as they do not believe that moral concerns should be
allowed to affect international relations, and they fear that intervention will produce further
conflict and destabilization.100
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Chapter III
Libya’s 2011 Popular Uprising and Aftermath
While having Libya as a case study for evaluating the principle of the humanitarian
intervention, this chapter is going to firstly give a brief overview on Libya before the popular
uprising in 2011, in order to understand the internal situation under the leadership of Al
Qaddafi, while giving more attention to the economic situation in the country at that time.
Then, this chapter will cover the period of the outbreak of the popular uprising and how the
international community responded towards the violence used against the protesters at that
time, until the adoption of resolutions 1970 and 1973 by the UNSC. In this regards, the
factors behind the adoption of both resolutions, especially resolution 1973 which authorized
the international intervene in the country, will be highlighted.
Then, this chapter will discuss the legality and the implementations of resolution 1973
during the international military intervention stage, which ended up by the death of
Al Qaddafi in October 2011. Following the end of NATO’s mission in Libya, the
international community decided to help the Libyans in building up their country by
providing assistance through the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Such
mission is considered a non-military type of international humanitarian intervention.
3.1 Overview of Libya before the 2011 popular uprising:
3.1.1 Al Qaddafi reign to power:
Muammar Al Qaddafi came to power in Libya after leading a bloodless coup against
King Idris. On the first of September 1969, the Free Unionist Officers movement, led by Al
Qaddafi, executed a successful coup d’etat, overthrew the monarchical regime that had ruled
Libya since its independence in 1951. Since then, “Al Qaddafi has articulated a
comprehensive, well-thought-out ideology, grounded in the revolutionary trinity of freedom,
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socialism and unity”.101
In other words, for much of the first two decades of the revolution,
the ideology of Al Qaddafi was defined in the familiar terms of “Arab nationalism, positive
neutrality, socialism, and Arab unity”.102However, the internal and external pressures
combined to force Al Qaddafi to introduce small, but noteworthy, reforms in the second half
of the 1980s. Following a prolonged period of international isolation, “Al Qaddafi at the end
of the 1990s again began to tout significant reforms. In the process, most of the major
ideological tenets of the 1st of September revolution were modified, replaced, or
discarded.”103
3.1.2 The Rise of the Jamahiriya and the Origins of the Fragile State:
In the early 1970s, Al Qaddafi introduced his so-called the Third Universal Theory,
which advanced the idea that “people should directly run the activities and exercise the
powers of government”. 104
The result of this system over the years was the virtual absence of
any development of a state bureaucracy or any form of institutionalized governmental
structure. 105
Al Qaddafi’s political ideology was laid down in his famous book, named the
Green Book, that mixed Islamism with socialism; in which he considered this book a guide
for all humanity. His book emphasized popular rules, stateless society, and direct democracy,
and called for populist economic policies. “Playing on the traditional Libyan suspicion of the
state, Al Qaddafi claimed not to be part of it and set up a system of informal governing
institutions alongside the formal instruments of power.”106
He would “use these institutions to
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control the political apparatus of the state while undermining and remaining formally
detached from it”.107
Furthermore, in 1977 the people of Libya proclaimed the Jamahiriya or
“government of the popular masses by themselves and for themselves.” 108
The Jamahiriya
was a higher form of direct democracy with “the People as President.”

109

Traditional

institutions of government were abolished and disbanded, and power belonged to the public
directly through various congresses and committees.110
The decision-making process under Al Qaddafi was restricted to a small team of
confidantes and advisors. Under Qaddafi’s rule, there was neither a constitution in the
modern sense nor political parties; the government used to operate on the basis of a complex
web of local structures built around family and tribal ties, business interests and other
informal forms of association.111
Though Qaddafi faced several coup attempts, he managed to
hold on to power. The Libyan uprising which started in February 2011 appears to be the most
serious challenge faced by Qaddafi in his 42-year-old rule.
3.1.3 Libya’s Tribalism
The tribal landscape must be understood along with Libya’s recent history, as the
country has not had political parties for more than four decades. Instead, Al Qaddafi had
encouraged the tribal system in order to use Libya’s tribes as a tool to strengthen his power
and ensure stability; in addition to filling the void left by the lack of the state effective
institutions. To explain, the tribal influence in the political process spread unofficially
through institutions, like the People’s Committees and People’s Congresses, through a system
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of promotions and people’s selection since 1977. 112
Qaddafi believed that these institutions
were the best means to rule his people and represented the official national umbrella for all
the forces in Libya, with a practical focus on the tribal leadership in each region. 113To
increase the loyalty of the tribes the Gaddafa tribe and to his regime; “Al Qaddafi took
several measures to support these tribes, including the 1990 law, which grants each tribe
exclusive ownership of land that was commonly theirs in the past, but has become part of the
urban real estate space.”114In 1997, Al Qaddafi was receiving delegations from different
tribes in Libya who pledged faithfulness to him and were made to sign documents “of what
was known as the “document of honour” under which they pledged allegiance to the
revolutionary system, and to unite against any clan or tribe attempting armed opposition to
the regime.” 115
This, it is believed, was the turning point in Libya’s social history. Qaddafi
largely encouraged tribalism so that he could control it and maintain power and “he did that
by the age-old tactic to divide and conquer.”116In different periods of time, Qaddafi would
empower some tribes over others. The objective was to extend his power rather than the
common misconception that he controlled tribal rivalry by uniting them.117
3.1.4 The economic situation in Libya before the 2011 popular uprising:
A: Oil
Since the discovery of the commercially viable oil deposits in the mid-1950s, oil has
decisively contributed to shaping the economic, social and political developments in the
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country.118According to the International Monetary Fund, Libya is overly dependent on
hydrocarbons, as they have long dominated the Libyan economy, “accounting for more than
70 percent of GDP, more than 95 percent of exports, and approximately 90 percent of
government revenue. With about 3.5 percent of the world’s proven crude oil reserves, Libya
has a prominent position in the international energy market.” 119
Before the popular uprising,
its “output was 1.77 million barrels per day of crude oil (equivalent to 2 percent of the global
output) and close to 0.2 million barrels-equivalent of natural gas”.120
B: The Financial Sector:
Furthermore, according to the international monetary fund, Libya’s financial sector
had been undergoing reforms before the popular uprising in 2011. Prior to 2007, the five
largest commercial banks were fully owned by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL). Reforms
included partial privatization and the involvement of foreign partners in six out of the 16
banks. Nevertheless, much of the banking system remains under the control of the
government, and state-owned specialized credit institutions play a major role in the financial
sector.
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However, “the performance of the banking sector had improved, as the total

commercial bank assets increased from Libyan dinar 14.5 billion at end-2003 to Libyan dinar
65.4 billion at end-2010. Financial soundness indicators improved over the period, with
nonperforming loans declining to 17.2 percent (from 35.5 percent in 2004), loan provisioning
increasing to 85 percent (from 51.8 percent in 2004), and the regulatory capital ratio
increasing to 17.3 percent, compared to 10.4 percent in 2004”.122
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In addition, following the lifting of earlier United Nations sanctions in 2003, the
economic activity increased steadily for seven years. During the period 2004-2010, the
average real GDP growth was approximately 5 percent, annual consumer price inflation
averaged less than 4 percent, and official foreign assets increased from $20 billion at the end
of 2003 to $170 billion at the end of 2010.123Although non-hydrocarbon economic activity
was growing at a rapid pace before the conflict, it still accounts for no more than 30 percent
of the GDP and a negligible part of total exports. In other words, while the non-hydrocarbon
sectors grew rapidly, supported by an ambitious public investment program, Libya remained
one of the most hydrocarbon-dependent countries, with its exports among the least diversified
in the world; “its small private sector was handicapped by the ubiquitous dominance of the
state and by crippling institutional failures. Consequently, social and governance indicators
remained poor, job creation was lacklustre, and dependence on expatriate workers
increased”.124
C: The Unemployment Problem:
As such, the unemployment in Libya, before the popular uprising, appears to be a
structural problem, particularly among youth, and the identification of policy measures and
structural reforms that would create employment opportunities is critical while considerable
potential to expand hydrocarbon production exists, the hydrocarbon industry is capital
intensive and therefore can make only a very limited contribution to employment growth.
“Hence, over the medium term, the main challenges are to reorient the economy away from
hydrocarbon dependence and to promote job creation and inclusive growth”.125
To explain, the oil abundance in Libya offsets the extreme scarcity of other resources,
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particularly, water. In a country in which approximately 90 percent of the territory is desert,
scarcity of agricultural lands and little industrial development have led to a growing urban
population “whose employability is almost exclusively dependent on the service
economy”126
. In economic terms, “Libya is a dualistic economy whereby the oil sector
contributes most to the GDP but employs little of the labor force and other sectors of the
labor force.”127
Due to the poorly developed non-oil economy, oil revenues have decisively
contributed to the historical expansion of the public sector. Consequently, in 2010, just before
the uprising, the public sector was estimated to employ around 85 percent of the labor force,
but “vertically the controlled system of patronage dominated the economic life of the
country”.128
As of the end of 2010, the unemployment rate was officially 13.5 percent, with
youth unemployment estimated at 25-30 percent. The lack of employment opportunities for
nationals can be traced back to the domination of the economy by the state, a mismatch
between the skills of workers and the demands of the private sector, as well as insufficient
labor productivity, all of which limit demand for Libyan workers129
.
D: Libya’s War with Chad and its Implications
On the other hand, the financial sector in Libya has been negatively affected by Al
Qaddafi’s strategies, which in turn resulted in declining the state’s capacity to finance
rentierism. To explain, the external interventions of Al Qaddafi’s regime in Africa can be
considered a burden to the Libyan economy, as in January 1973, Libya went into conflict
with Chad over the Aouzou strip, with Libya forces occupying the area, establishing a new
administration and distributing Libyan identity cards. The strip soon became an advance base
for deeper penetration into Chad’s territory. A Chadian campaign with substantial French
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military support in August 1987 briefly droves the Libyans out of the Strip and it estimated to
have cost Qaddafi “one tenth of his army, 7500 men killed, and as much as $1.5 billion-worth
of military equipment.”130Shortly after the defeat, Libya launched a new campaign to
recapture the area among an unusually heavy and intense fighting. The military defeats and
losses on both sides eventually promoted Libya and Chad to agree to cease fire in late
1987.131
Thus, such costly intervention that Qaddafi regime went to has its negative effects on
the financial sector in the country.
E: Al Qaddafi’s Non-Rewarding Projects (the Great Manmade River Project):
Furthermore, Qaddafi’s huge and non-rewarding new projects have also been a
burden to the financial sector in Libya, as in 1983 Qaddafi has launched the Great Manmade
River Project (GMRP), “aiming at a rational utilization of the transported water for
agricultural and urban developments, along with restoration of the affected aquifers.” 132
Such
project consists of five phases and was planned to be completed before the turn of the century
and to cost about $10 billion. 133
Al Qaddafi’s regime had expected that the GMRP would be
considered the most important economic development project; however, “cost overruns and
delays have plagued the GMRP since the initial planning of the project in 1983. On the basis
of installation needs and engineering expense, the project costs increased to reach up to $30
billion spread over 10 to 15 years”.134
Such high expenses of the project have negatively
affected the financial sector and in turn resulted in declining the state capacity to finance
rentierism, bearing in mind that until the outbreak of the popular uprising, “only 70 percent of
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the project has been completed.”135
3.2 The Popular Uprising in Libya in 2011 and the International Community’s Response:
Inspired by the popular uprising in the other Arab countries, especially its neighboring
Egypt and Tunisia, on 15 February, just four days after Mubarak’s resignation, protests
started in Libya against the 42-year rule of Muammar Al Qaddafi. Although the Libyan, ‘Day
of Rage’ was organized for the 17th of February, it started two days earlier in Benghazi, with
the arrest of the young human rights lawyer activist Fathi Terbil. Although the supporters
gathered peacefully outside the local police station calling for Terbil’s release, they were
fired upon by the security services;136
tear gas, batons and hot water were used to disperse the
protesters. Then, “as demonstrations intensified, the government began using deadly force
against protesters. This move backfired; as the protesters attacked and burned down
government buildings”.137In the following day, general protests against the government
spread to other towns and despite the government warning, large demonstrations took place
in at least four major cities, including Benghazi and Tripoli, on February 17. The
demonstrations then rapidly increased in scale and ferocity until they evolved into a countrywide popular uprising against Al Qaddafi, where deadly clashes break out in several towns.138
Later on, the regime committed more desperate acts of violence and issued terrifying
threats. On the night of 20 February Al Qaddafi’s son Saif Al-Islam appeared on the Libyan
television threatening that thousands would die and that rivers of blood would flow if the
rebellions did not stop. Soon after, Al Qaddafi called upon loyalists to get out of their houses
and attack all the opponents of the regime, he described the protesters as drug-crazed “rats,”
“cockroaches” and “cowards and traitors,” and stated his intentions to “cleanse Libya house
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by house.” 139
The protests continue to turn violent, however the death and injury toll was
unclear and as the uprising spread, the Libyan police were forced out of Benghazi and then
from Misrata. A number of towns in the east of the country began to slip from Qaddafi’s
control, as the anti-Libyan government militias took control of Misrata after expelling the
forces loyal to Al Qaddafi.140The situation shifted inevitably from demonstrations to a
popular uprising as volunteer militias were formed across the east of the country.
In this regards, it is worth mentioning that the estimates of the number of civilians
killed between 15 and 22 February vary. The UN Human Rights Council’s International
Commission of Inquiry received medical records regarding rebels shot dead in Tripoli, with
doctors testifying that more than 200 persons killed over 20-21 February. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) later estimated that 500 to 700 civilians were killed in February prior to
the outbreak of the conflict.141
On 21 February 2011, Libya’s Deputy Permanent Representative at the Libyan
mission to the United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi, broke with the Al Qaddafi’s regime and
condemned the use of violence against demonstrators in Benghazi. The following day the
Arab League condemned the use of force against civilians by the Al Qaddafi regime and
suspended Libya’s participation in the League until met its demands to immediately put a
stop to the violence.142 In addition, the former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
condemns what he calls “egregious violations” of human rights as Libya tries to crush an
ongoing revolt, telling reporters that those who have shed “the blood of innocents” must face
punishment.143 Later on, the Security Council debated the situation in Libya and
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subsequently adopted resolution 1970 on February 26.144
Such resolution, which was adopted
by an unanimous vote, condemned the violence used against civilians and called upon the
Libyan authorities to exercise their responsibility to protect. Acting under Chapter VII it
referred the actions of the Libyan government to the ICC and adopted an arms embargo,
invoked a travel ban on selected Libyan authorities, froze the assets of these authorities held
abroad, and called upon member states to provide humanitarian assistance to Libyans.
However, the failure of these measures to change the Libyan government’s response to the
uprisings, the continued violence on the ground, and most significantly the threats issued by
Al Qaddafi to the rebels in Benghazi led to a second Resolution 1973 approved without a
dissenting vote and five abstentions.
To explain, on 17 March, the Security Council met for a second time to discuss the
continuing violence on Libya and adopted resolution 1973.145Once again the resolution
condemned the violence, the threat to civilian lives and the Libyan government’s
responsibility to protect. It also recalled the condemnations of regional organizations
specially the League of Arab States, the African Union (AU) and the Secretary General of the
Islamic Conference. Acting once again under Chapter VII, the resolution called for a
ceasefire and dispatched an envoy of the Secretary General alongside an envoy from the
Peace and Security Council of the AU to seek a political settlement. The resolution went on
to authorize member states to take all necessary measures excluding a foreign occupation
force of any form on any part of Libyan territory to protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat to attack in cooperation with members of the League of Arab States. The
resolution also established a no-fly zone and authorized member states to enforce compliance
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in coordination with the Secretary General and the League of Arab States and reinforced the
arms embargo.146
3.3 Intervention Explained: Factors behind the adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 by the
UNSC:
The international response to the crisis in Libya, from the beginning of the popular
uprising, has been remarkably quick and decisive, in which it ended up, having the UNSC
member states adopting resolution 1973; a resolution that authorized the international
community, and later on NATO, to military intervene in Libya. But the question now is what
are the factors that encouraged the UNSC to adopt such quick decisions on Libya; taking into
consideration that “resolution 1973 marked the first time that the United Nations Security
Council explicitly mandated the use of force against a functioning state to prevent imminent
atrocity crimes”.147
3.3.1 The International and Regional Call for Response:
There are many factors behind the UNSC adoption of the previously mentioned
resolutions; one of which is the warnings raised by the UN entities and the regional
organizations regarding the critical situation in Libya, which ended up having the League of
Arab States requesting the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. To illustrate, with the
increase of violence used by Al Qaddafi against the civilians; condemnations of the violent
suppression by the Qaddafi regime mounted from both the UN entities and the regional
organizations, including the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation
Council and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. On February 22, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called for an immediate ending of the human
rights violations committed by Libyan authorities and urged an independent investigation into
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the violent suppression of protests.148
On the same day, the League of Arab States decided to
suspend Libya from the organization, the UNSC issued a statement urging the Libyan
authorities to meet its responsibility to protect its population and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference stated that it considers the ongoing coercion and oppression in Libya as a
humanitarian catastrophe.
Later on, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, of which Libya was a
member, condemned “the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons
against peaceful protestors, in violation of human rights and International Humanitarian
Law”149
that was used in response to the “legitimate, aspirations of the people of Libya for
democracy, political reform, justice and socio-economic development.” 150
Two days later, on
25 February, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of inquiry to
investigate the situation and urged the General Assembly to suspend Libya from the Human
Rights Council, which it duly did on the 1st of March. 151
The situation in Libya combined with the calls for action from various regional
organizations led the Security Council to unanimously adopt Resolution 1970 on 26
February. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Council demanded “an immediate
end to the violence and authorized measures short of armed force, including an arms
embargo, freezing of Libyan assets, bans on travel for key Libyan leaders as well as referring
the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC)”152
.
Despite the implementation of measures pursuant to Resolution 1970 and the
international condemnations, the Libyan government continued the brutalities against its own
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people and called on its supporters to attack the demonstrators. The regional organizations
thus saw the need for stronger international pressure and by early March the Gulf
Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Conference endorsed a no-fly zone,
followed on March by the Arab League’s call for a no-fly zone in combination with the
establishment of safe areas.153To illustrate, On 8 March the Organization of the Islamic
Conference released a statement supporting a no-fly zone over Libya but excluded foreign
military operations on the ground. On 10 March the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) said the Qaddafi regime had lost its legitimacy. The GCC also encouraged the
Arab League to initiate contact with the Interim Council in Benghazi and call on the UN
Security Council to establish a no-fly zone to protect civilians. This followed a 7 March GCC
statement supporting a no-fly zone and calling for accountability.154
Later, on 12 March the Arab League met at ministerial-level in Cairo on the situation
in Libya (it had previously suspended Libya’s participation on 22 February until the violence
stopped) and issued a statement which noted Libyan authorities use of military aircraft,
mortars and heavy weaponry against civilians and called on the Security Council to impose a
no-fly zone155and announced its recognition to the rebel movement as that country’s
legitimate government.156The Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa announced at
that time that the league’s decision, describing the no fly-zone as a “preventive measure”
whose chief goal is to “protect Libyan citizens,” adding that “The main priority right now is
to stop the deadly situation.”157
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The call of the League of Arab League to the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over the
country to protect the civilians was one of the key turning points in the UNSC negotiations
that led to the adoption of resolution 1973; as both Russia and China place rhetorical
emphasis on the importance of regional organizations, and to some extent their diplomacy
backs their rhetoric; so the Arab League’s call for action eased the pathway to abstention, a
point made explicit in the Chinese explanation of their vote. 158
3.3.2 The humanitarian needs:
Furthermore, the demonstrable need to protect the Libyan civilians was another
crucial factor behind the adoption of the resolution. To explain, the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported about ill-treatment, beatings, injuries,
rapes, torture, killings, enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests of protesters including
lawyers, human rights defenders and journalists. Reports further said that “Libyan forces
fired at random on protesters and bystanders from rooftops and tanks and used warplanes and
helicopters to strike at demonstrators.”159The Libyan authorities also used foreign
mercenaries and there was a massive passage of weapons to Libyan territory. The Libyan
government moreover attempted to restrict the broadcasting of the situation in the country by
cutting off landlines and internet access and by restricting media coverage. 160In addition,
prior to the resolution, on 17 March, speaking on a radio show in Tripoli, Qaddafi raised the
levels of urgency of the situation. He threatened civilians living in areas that refused to
comply with his rule, declaring ‘We will come house by house, room by room…. We will
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find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity.”161
As such, later the same day
resolution 1973 was endorsed by the Security Council.
3.3.3 The decision of the UNSC Member States
Moreover, the most important factor behind the adoption of resolution 1973 is the
decision of the five permanent countries. Although the resolution was not completely
welcomed and supported by all the permanent member states, none of them decided to veto
it, as Russia and China decided to abstain only. As such resolution 1973 was adopted by a
vote of 10 in favor to none against, and with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India,
Russian Federation).162
A: The Resolution Supported by Three Permanent UNSC States
Resolution 1973 was completely supported by France, the United States, and the
United Kingdom, as before the adoption of the resolution the representative of France stated
that the draft resolution provided the council with the means to protect the civilian population
in Libya, declaring that his country was prepared to act with Member States, in particular
Arab States, that wished to support this initiative.163In addition, in the statements that
followed the vote, several representatives who had supported the text agreed that strong
action was necessary because of the Libyan regime’s failure to heed the provisions of the
previous resolution and considering the impending threat of further violence against the
Libyan civilians. The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the fact that the
Council had acted swiftly and comprehensively in response to the situation in Libya, and the
representative of the United States stated that resolution 1973 (2011) represented a powerful
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response to the call of the League of Arab States to protect Libyan civilians. 164
Later on, the
British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the military action against Al Qaddafi was
“necessary, it is legal and it is right.” 165
Right, “because I do not believe that we should stand
aside while this dictator murders his own people.” 166
In addition, French President Sarkozy
said, “If we intervene on the side of the Arab nations it is because of a universal conscience
that cannot tolerate such crimes.”

167

“I'm not one of those cynics who assumes that such

statements are devoid of content; in any event, they are grounded in language that was
already quite condemnatory of Libya in resolution 1973”.168
B: The Resolution Welcomed by Arab and African UNSC Non-Permanent States
In addition, the decision was also welcomed by both the Arab and African UNSC
non-permanent member states by voting, as well, in favor of the resolution, while having
their representatives defending their support to the adoption of the resolution at that time. To
illustrate, starting with Lebanon, the only Arab non-permanent UNSC member state at that
time, its representative in the UNSC stated that “Lebanon, agreeing with the League of Arab
States, had then called on the Security Council to establish measures to protect civilians. The
Libyan authorities had lost all their legitimacy and the resolution was aimed at protecting
Libyan civilians.”169
He stressed that the text would not result in the occupation of one inch
of the Libyan territory by the foreign forces and hoped that the resolution would have a
preventive role and end the Libyan authorities’ use of force. In addition, he reaffirmed full
support for the county’s sovereignty, the need for full cooperation between the United
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Nations and the League of Arab States, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter, and the necessity of a peaceful solution to the situation. The resolution was fraught
with hope for Libya and its people, he concluded. 170
Furthermore, the African non-permanent UNSC member states, Nigeria, South Africa
and Gabon, had also expressed their support to the resolution, the representative of Nigeria at
the UNSC had condemned the situation in Libya, adding that her delegation’s persistent calls
for peace were rooted in the need to ensure the protection of civilians and the delivery of
humanitarian assistance to those most in need, many of whom were Nigerian nationals.

171

She said that while her delegation had supported the current text, it also believed that foreign
occupation was not an option to ensure peace. Nigeria supported language in the current text
that negated that possibility. Nigeria was also encouraged by the fact that the political path to
a solution was endorsed in the text. “Today, we have sent an unequivocal message to the
Libyan people that the dignity and safety of every man woman and child is paramount,” she
said, adding that when the fate of innocent civilians was in question, the international
community, undaunted, must be ready to respond.” 172
In this context, in addition to expressing his deep concern regarding the fast becoming
civil war in Libya, the representative of South Africa hoped the problem could be resolved in
a peaceful manner, according to the will of the Libyan people, while stating that any solution
must also preserve the solidarity and integrity of Libya and, as such, South Africa supported
the dispatch by the African Union of a special mission to the country. 173
In addition, he
clarified that “South Africa regretted that the Council’s previous resolution had not been
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heeded and believed that by adopting the current text, the Council had acted responsibly to
answer the call of Libyan people. It would also speed humanitarian assistance to those that
needed it most while hoping that the letter and spirit of the present resolution would be
implemented in full.” 174
C: The Abstention of Russia and China:
On the other hand, although the representatives of Russia and China were not
convinced that the intervention is the best way to put an end to the conflict in Libya and they
were not among the supporters of the resolution; they decided only to abstain and not to veto
the resolution, while prioritizing peaceful means of resolving the conflict in their
explanations. Their representatives clarified their position stating that many questions had not
been answered in regard to provisions of the resolution, including, as the Russian
representative put it, how and by whom the measures would be enforced and what the limits
of the engagement would be. He said the resolution included a sorely needed ceasefire,
which he had called for earlier. In addition, China had not blocked the action with a negative
vote in consideration of the wishes of the Arab League, its representative said.175
To illustrate, during the informal consultations on resolution 1973, the Russian
Federation raised many concerns on “how the no-fly zone would be enforced, what the rules
of engagement would be and what limits on the use of force there would be” 176
; moreover,
the introduction of paragraph 4 in the resolution gave rise to concern that it would
“potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention” 177
. The decision to abstain
and refrain from casting a veto was explained partly on the assurances given by the sponsors
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of the resolution that there was no intention of launching a large-scale armed intervention and
by the necessity to protect the civilian population; but it was asserted that an immediate
ceasefire in Libya would be “the quickest way to ensure robust security for the civilian
population and the long- term stabilization of the situation in Libya” 178
.
In the same context, China took the stand that they are ‘always against the use of
force in international relations.’ They emphasized that the Security Council ‘should follow
the United Nations Charter and the norms governing international law, respect the
sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve the current
crisis in Libya through peaceful means.’179
China was less explicit on its decision to abstain
referring basically to the lack of satisfactory answers to questions on the action envisaged by
the resolution.180
As shortly after Resolution 1973 was passed, disagreement emerged on the
scope and limits of the mandate and already on the day the aerial attacks on Libya started,
concerns were raised about military overreach. The Chinese government expressed regret at
the American and European assault on Libya and Russia condemned the attack. 181
3.3.3 D: Concerns Raised by the Other UNSC Non-Permanent States:
In addition, aside from the five permanent member states, there were many concerns
raised by the other UNSC member states. Germany, one of the five abstaining countries,
found that it could not support use of force as they saw great risks. They found that the
military option could lead to large-scale loss of life and if the steps taken in the resolution
turned out to be ineffective, there was a danger to be drawn in to a protracted military conflict
that would affect the wider region. Also they pointed out that the member States should not
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enter in to a “militarily confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few
casualties would be achieved”. 182
In the same context, Germany explained its abstention on
two grounds: first that the sanctions regime imposed by UNSC resolution 1970 should be
strengthened so as to achieve a political transition and, secondly, that the authorization of the
use of force would entail large-scale loss of life and might affect the wider region.
India took issue with the lack of information on the situation on the ground and with
the absence of clarifying the specific measures to be employed, by whom and the manner
they would be implemented. 183
Another point made by India was that the member States did
not have clarity about details of enforcement measures, who would participate with what
assets and how those measures would be exactly carried out. From the Indian delegations’
expressed opinions, it may seem as the member states blindly entered into military
confrontation based on little information and in this respect, little objective information to
support the heavy military invention it would turn in to after NATO enforced the mandate. 184
Brazil, for its part, considered that the measures anticipated in paragraph 4 of UNSC
resolution 1973 went beyond the imposition of a no-fly zone as requested by the League of
Arab States. The representative of Brazil stated that:
We are not convinced that the use of force … will lead to the
realization of our common objective, the immediate end to violence and the
protection of civilians. We are also concerned that such measures may have
the unintended effect of exacerbating tensions on the ground and causing
more harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed to
protecting. Many thoughtful commentators have noted that an important
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aspect of the popular movement in North Africa and the Middle East is their
spontaneous, home-grown nature. We are also concerned about the possibility
that the use of force, as called for in paragraph 4 ... could change that
narrative in ways that may have serious repercussions for the situation and
beyond. Protecting civilians, ensuring a lasting settlement and addressing the
legitimate demands of the Libyan people require diplomacy and dialogue. 185
In brief, for the five-member states that decided to abstain the greatest obstacle to the
accomplishment of a wider consensus was the divergence of opinion over the need to use
force. Germany and Brazil questioned the effectiveness of such a step and expected the
possibility that it might actually make matters worse, while India suggested that the
mandating of force was a premature move and voiced concerns over the ambiguities of the
authorization. China, declaring itself to be always against the use of force, shared India’s
latter anxiety, as did Russia, which perceived a morphing of the pro-intervention position into
something which could “potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention.”186
In conclusion, Libya’s lack of friends, both in the region and beyond, meant that no
country was prepared to block the Security Council authorization of a no-fly zone. Even
though the African Union formally opposed the no-fly zone, many individual countries
within the continent had no regrets about Qaddafi’s rule coming to an end. Indeed, Al
Qaddafi himself had a long history of getting involved in the domestic affairs of other
countries, having backed armed groups in many countries. Among Arab states, Qaddafi had
gone out of his way to foment tensions and sever friendships. 187
One illustration of this was
Al Qaddafi’s outburst at an Arab League Summit in Qatar in 2009, where, after publicly
humiliating the former Saudi Arabia’s king Abdullah, he went on to declare himself the dean
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of the Arab leaders, the king of kings of Africa and the leader of the faithful. This among
many other public insults, ensured that Al Qaddafi was alienated from other states in the
Middle East.

188

“Further afield, Al Qaddafi had not fostered ties with either China or

Russia.” 189
“Compared to Syria, Assad’s ties with Russia has to some extent protected the
Assad regime from a more robust Security Council response to atrocities there, Libya had no
such connection to fall back on. Indeed, the Kremlin had long been wary of Al Qaddafi due
to his support for terrorist organizations, including some with links to those in Chechnya and
Dagestan.”190
3.4 The International Intervention in Libya in 2011:
Through resolution 1973, the UN Security Council authorized Member States, acting
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures
to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding
a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory and requesting them to
immediately inform the Secretary-General of such measures.191
The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and
decisive. As immediately following the adoption of Resolution 1973, NATO countries began
assembling forces to carry out strikes against Libya's military installations. The United States,
UK and French officials took the lead, meeting in Paris from 17-19 March to plan the
implementation of the no-fly zone and discuss plan for airstrike operations,192
with the aim to
protect Libyan civilians and degrade the regime’s capability to resist the no-fly zone. At that
time, the situation in Benghazi was deteriorating, with civilians at risk of massacre by proQaddafi’s forces. French forces were the first to engage, sending plans to attack tanks and
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armed forces, thereby deterring the regime's military advance on Benghazi. On 19 March,
fighter planes from France, the United Kingdom and the United States launched attacks in
Libya. Then the NATO officially began to enforce the arms embargo against Libya on March
23, and the member countries dispatched warships to the region to intercept sea transports
carrying equipment to Libya. The next day, on 24 March, NATO formally enforced the nofly zone. Later, on 31 March, NATO assumed sole command and control of the international
military effort to assumed sole command and control of the international military effort to
enforce all aspects of Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973, as part of Operation
Unified Protector (OUP) thereby replacing the individual efforts and operation names. The
OUP had three distinct components which are the enforcement of an arms embargo on the
high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and
mercenaries to Libya; in addition to the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any
aircraft from bombing civilian targets; and air and naval strikes against those military forces
involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.193
Later, on 14 April, the representatives of the countries participating in OUP agreed to
commit all necessary resources for as long as necessary until “all attacks on civilians and
civilian-populated areas have ended,” the “Qaddafi’s regime withdraws all military and paramilitary forces to bases” and “the Qaddafi’s regime permits immediate, full, safe and
unhindered access to humanitarian aid for the Libyan people.”
Then the goal of the intervention expanded quickly as NATO and the international
community committed to seeing Al Qaddafi step down. As in April, the former U.S.
President Barak Obama, the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the former British
Prime Minister David Cameron published a joint pledge asserting that regime change must
take place in order to achieve the stated humanitarian goal of protecting Libyan civilians. The
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issue came to head when, in May, Al Qaddafi offered a ceasefire with the rebels, thereby
ending attacks against civilians, but which would allow him to stay in power. NATO rejected
the Libyan offer, determined that regime change was the only solution.194
By mid-August, however, the opposition had gained enough strength to attack
Qaddafi's strongholds, first in Tripoli and then in Sirte. Within two months, the Libyan
National Transitional Council had secured control over the entire country and rebels had
captured and killed Qaddafi.195
Then a day after the death of Al Qaddafi on 20 October 2011,
the North Atlantic Council took the preliminary decision to end OUP at the end of the month.
During that transition period, NATO continued to monitor the situation and retained the
capacity to respond to threats to civilians, if needed.196A week later, the North Atlantic
Council confirmed the decision to end OUP. On 31 October 2011 at midnight Libyan time, a
NATO concluded the last sortie; 222 days after the operation began. The next day, NATO
maritime assets left Libyan waters for their home ports.197
To Sum-up, the NATO has succeeded in coordinating the actions of 18 countries, 14
member states and four partners, under a unified command. “The United States certainly
played a critical role, providing intelligence, fueling, and targeting capabilities.” 198
But other
states made similarly indispensable contributions. “France and the United Kingdom flew over
40 percent of the sorties, together destroying more than a third of the overall targets. Italy
provided aircraft for reconnaissance missions and, along with Greece, access to a large
number of air bases. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates
deployed fighters for combat operations, and Jordan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
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Turkey, and Qatar helped enforce the no-fly zone. Many of these states, as well as Bulgaria
and Romania, also deployed naval assets to enforce the arms embargo.”199
3.5 The Legality of the 2011 International Intervention
The UN Security Council issued three key statements which show the evolution of its
stance on Libya in the lead-up to NATO’s intervention. With increasing escalation, these
were a non-binding press statement on 22 February, followed by two resolutions adopted
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on 26 February and 17 March. Taken together, these
actions show a response from the Security Council that is noteworthy for its speed, expansive
no-fly zone mandate and changed politics toward the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Ambassador Condoleezza Rice, the former US secretary of state, stated on Libya: “I can’t
remember a time in recent memory when the Council has acted so swiftly, so decisively, and
in unanimity on an urgent matter of international human rights”.200
Although the Security
Council had mandated the use of force by peacekeepers many times, and although there had
been several cases in which the council delegated the use of force to a third party, the Libya
intervention was the first time that the council mandated a military intervention to be
conducted by a third party with the explicit purpose of protecting civilians. 201
Supporters of
the resolution maintained that the intervention was humanitarian in nature, motivated solely
by the objective of protecting human rights and the lives of the Libyan population. But what
about the legality of such intervention; should the intervention of the international
community/ the NATO be considered legal?
The enabling provisions of UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) authorizing the use of force
by applying the standard phrase “all necessary measures” are operative paragraphs 4 and 8
which read:
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4. “Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures,
notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on
any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to
inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant
to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall immediately
reported to the Security Council ;” 202
8. “Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the
Secretary of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional
organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce
compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as
necessary.”203
In other words, resolution 1973 has two important objectives. The first is to protect civilians,
by authorizing all UN members to “take all necessary measures … to protect civilians …
under threat of attack … while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part
of Libyan territory” 204
. While the second is to imposes an effective no fly zone in the form of
a ban on all flights in Libya's airspace, except for those with an exclusively humanitarian
purpose, to help protect civilians.205
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Here according to the UN charter; Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that “All
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.” Furthermore, article 2(7) of the charter states that
nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter, but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
There are two recognized exceptions to Articles 2(4) and 2(7) in the UN charter,
namely self-defence under Article 51, or when acting with authorization from the Security
Council under its chapter VII that addresses “threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts
of aggression.” Formally the UN charter only recognize the legitimacy of armed conflict in
these very limited situations. Armed conflicts outside these exceptions are not legitimate and
are accordingly a breach of international law. 206
Thus, when resolution 1973 was adopted in March 2011, it facilitated the legal
framework for the subsequent NATO led operation in Libya. The authorization to use force,
points back to the stated objective, namely to ensure protection of civilians. Every limitation
posed in the mandate is also conditioned to the protection of civilians. The aim of the
mandate was to protect civilians and civilian populated areas, while the mission was to use all
necessary measures to protect the civilian population against threats of attack. It is clear from
the language in the resolution that the R2P was endorsed as a principle by the UN. In
resolution 1973 the council found it necessary to reiterate the Libyan authorities’
responsibility to protect the civilian population. Secondly, the council expressed “its
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determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas”. 207
3.6 The other type of intervention: the UNSMIL
After the NATO ended its mission in Libya, the international community decided to help
the Libyans in building up their country by providing assistance from the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). To illustrate, after six months of the armed conflict in
Libya, on 16 September 2011, by resolution 2009 (2011), adopted unanimously, the Council
established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).208The mission was
established at the request of the Libyan authorities at that time to support the country's new
transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts.209The mission at that time was
authorized for an initial period of three months, to assist and support Libyan national efforts
to restore public security and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue,
promote national reconciliation and embark upon the constitution-making and electoral
process. It would also support national efforts to extend State authority, including by
strengthening institutions and the restoration of public services, promote and protect human
rights and support transitional justice, and take steps to initiate economic recovery. In support
of those objectives, the Council authorized exemptions to the arms embargo solely for
security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities and for the use of United Nations
and humanitarian personnel. It also authorized modification of the asset freeze targeting
entities connected to the regime, for humanitarian and other purposes. The Council
emphasized its intention to keep under review the measures concerning a no-fly zone
imposed by resolution 1973 (2011) and, when circumstances permitted and in consultation
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with the Libyan authorities, to lift those measures and terminate the authorization given to
Member States.210
The United Nations Supporting Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) has substantive staff in
political affairs, human rights, transitional justice, mine action, demobilization, development,
women’s empowerment, public information and communication, as well as support staff. Its
mandate was modified and extended by the Security Council in resolutions 2022 (2011),
2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2238 (2015) and 2323 (2016). Its current mandate is
stipulated by the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2376 (2017), which extended
UNSMIL's mission until 15 September 2018.211
To conclude, this chapter gave a brief overview of both the political and economic
situations in Libya under the rule of Al Qaddafi, which contributed to the fragility of the
state. Such fragility, as the next chapter will show, is considered one of the factors explaining
the collapse of the state after the international intervention in 2011. The chapter went through
the outbreak of the popular uprising in 2011, while reflecting on how the international
community responded to the escalating violence that took place during the popular uprising;
which ended up having the UNSC adopting resolution 1973 that allow the international
community to intervene to protect the civilians under threat. In addition, this chapter referred
to the guidelines for the intervention, as it explained in depth the factors that encourage the
UNSC to adopt resolutions 1970 and 1973 after days from the beginning of the popular
uprising, such factors involved the international and regional calls for the protection of
civilians under threat, and the existence of the demonstrable need to protect the civilians in
Libya under threat, while the third factor covers the decision of the UNSC permanent
members that did not veto the resolution.
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Furthermore, this chapter covers the international intervention stage, starting with the
military intervention which began directly after the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the
UNSC, as NATO countries began assembling forces to carry out strikes against Libya's
military installations; such response to the crisis in Libya has been seen as remarkably quick
and decisive. In this regards, this chapter reflected how the international community has
expanded its mandate from just protecting the civilians under threat to engaging in the regime
change process, then continued supporting the rebellions until Al Qaddafi was killed on 20
October 2011. Then this chapter highlighted the other type of international intervention. After
the NATO ended its mission in Libya, the international community decided to help the
Libyans in building up their country by providing assistance through the United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).
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Chapter IV
Libya Post the International Intervention in 2011
This chapter focuses on evaluating the outcome/consequences of the international
intervention in Libya in order to figure out whether it should be considered a successful
intervention, or it leads to an increase in the threats facing the civilians in Libya. As such it
started with giving an overview on the situation in Libya after the international intervention
in 2011 while reflecting on the deterioration in the internal situation there. Then, the second
section of this chapter will focus on the reasons behind such deterioration, while arguing that
the abuse of the humanitarian intervention and the fragility of the Libyan state are responsible
for the instability that Libya has been suffering since 2011 and are the main factors behind its
collapse.
4.1 The Situation in Libya post the International Intervention in 2011:
Following the intervention of the international community and the death of
Al Qaddafi, there were high optimistic expectations regarding the future of Libya post Al
Qaddafi; in this regards, some politicians and analysts started highlighting the success of the
intervention and the R2P principle. The Libyan intervention has sometimes “been hailed as a
victory for the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect vulnerable population.”212
To
illustrate, many commentators have praised NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya as a
humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in the country’s second largest city, Benghazi,
and helping eliminate the dictatorial regime of Al Qaddafi. Accordingly, these proponents
claimed that the intervention demonstrates how to successfully implement a humanitarian
principle known as the responsibility to protect. Indeed, the top U.S. representatives to the
transatlantic alliance declared that “NATO’s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a
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model intervention.”213
For Ramesh Thakur, one of the co-authors of the ICISS Report, the military action by
the international forces in Libya marked the intervention as “the first instance of the
implementation of the sharp edge of the new norm of the responsibility to protect”. Indeed, it
was “the first time the Security Council authorized an international R2P operation” 214
.
Similarly, Gareth Evans, the former Australian Foreign Minister and ICISS co-chair,
regarded the Libyan intervention as “a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it
was supposed to, with nothing else in issue but stopping continuing and imminent mass
atrocity crimes.” 215Peter Hilpold, too, saw the authorization by the Security Council to use
force against Libya “as a pivotal step for the further affirmation of this principle.” 216
And the
former UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, was certain that “by now it was clear to all that
R2P had arrived”.217
Yet both the particular circumstances surrounding the intervention and its aftermath
have raised questions about the depth of the government’s sincere commitment to such
humanitarian norms;218
as in spite of such optimistic views, the situation in Libya has been
deteriorated day after another, till Libya has been suffering from civil war and then becoming
a failed state. To illustrate, Libya has been in crisis since the end of the country’s Arab Spring
in October 2011.219
With the fall of the Qaddafi’s regime on 20 October 2011, Libya has
entered into a new insecurity phase. While some commentators called this the post-conflict
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phase, or the peace-building phase, a more accurate analytical description would call it the
fragmentation phase. To explain, after the popular uprising, Libya has descended into another
type of security disorder. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which is considered the
institutional platform for the rebel movement, aimed at “providing political and military
leadership, basic security and municipal services, and support for Libyans living abroad.”220
However, the transitional authorities have faced enormous challenges. “Chief among these
have been controlling and managing the armed groups that emerged to fight Al Qaddafi and
his security services.”221The political roadmap for the transition, the constitutional
declaration chartered by the NTC on 3 August 2011, set strict deadlines for elections to a new
interim body, the General National Congress (GNC), as well as a timetable for the committee
to draft a constitution. However, “the political coalition that drew up the declaration
presented no vision for security sector reform, neither with respect to the remainder of
Qaddafi’s armed forces, nor with respect to the field commanders who had done the bulk of
the fighting.”222
To explain, the security sector presented the first large difficulty223
for both the NTC
and the Libyans after the end of the popular uprising; as the post-conflict transition has been
disrupted by armed militia groups and threatened by the conflict of interim leaders, 224in
which those who fought in the civil war did not all wish to demobilize,225
and the interim
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government was unable to maintain law and order.

226

The war against Al Qaddafi was

conducted by individual militias rather than by a unified rebel army. Although these militias
were united in their efforts to remove the regime, after the war, many have thus far chosen to
hold onto their weapons and pursue their own agendas. “Those agendas vary from acting as a
surrogate state or simply keeping the peace in the territory they occupy to attacking other
militias and building links with criminal organizations”. 227
As such, The NTC had at various
times tried to dissolve the militias. At the same time, “bereft of the ability to project its
authority, it began subsidizing militias, placing them under the nominal control of the
ministries of interior and defense”228
. But these ministries were themselves captured by
competing political factions. “The result was a swelling of militias, beyond the number that
had fought in the popular uprising, and the formation of a localized, highly divided and
hybrid-security sector that existed in parallel to the decrepit army and police.”229
To explain,
factions that had a military presence in Tripoli and were able to wield direct influence on
government officials enjoyed a privileged position in these distributive struggles. Elsewhere,
local elites and militia leaders who felt sidelined in these rivalries began exerting pressure on
the government by shutting down parts of the energy infrastructure. Cities and tribes that
were branded as regime loyalists by the competing revolutionary factions were largely
excluded from these struggles. They further suffered under the “former revolutionary
strongholds’ military supremacy, which was manifest in numerous local conflicts.”230
Thus, the NTC, whose representatives sought to convince the Western governments
of the necessity to intervene, rapidly lost control over the armed groups. The revolutionaries
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organized almost exclusively at the local level, on the basis of individual cities or
neighborhoods, and were infused with local identities. In Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains,
deserting military officers joined with armed civilians. But in the east, where entire army
units had defected to the rebellion, “revolutionary fighters often eyed the officers of
Gadhafi’s former army with distrust.”231Within the NTC itself, tensions soon surfaced
between defecting government officials and members of the exiled opposition, some of them
Islamists. 232
In such context, the situation continued to have a negative impact on the living
conditions and security of the local population and was aggravated by the high rate of gun
ownership among the population in the absence of any disarmament and effective weapons
control efforts.233
To explain, immediately after being in power, the rebels perpetrated scores of reprisal
killings, in addition to torturing, beating, and randomly detaining thousands of suspected
Qaddafi‘s supporters. The rebels also expelled 30,000 mostly black residents from the town
of Tawergha and burned or looted their homes and shops, on the grounds that some of them
supposedly had been mercenaries. in the government’s attacks on nearby Misrata.234The
ramification of this racial violence has been nationwide: “For the more than one million
African guest workers who came to oil-rich Libya seeking their fortunes, it has meant terror ..
These innocent migrant laborers now and themselves singled out by ordinary Libyans and
rebels who believe they are the enemy.” 235
In spite of the violence of the militias in the first half of 2012, the NTC was able to
hold the elections on the agreed dates, 7 July 2012, which ended up having the General
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National congress being elected with a mandate to create a constitution. Through such
elections the Islamists, principally the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party,
won a narrow governing majority through alliances, mainly with tribal leaders and parties
from Misrata. 236
The GNC assembled on 8 August 2012 and appointed a Government in
December 2012. However, the GNC Government was unable to project state authority and
security across the whole of Libya.

237

The strength of rebel militias has increased,238the

Radical Islamist groups, suppressed under Al Qaddafi, emerged as the fiercest rebels during
the war and refused to disarm or submit to government authority afterward. Their persistent
threat was highlighted by the September 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed
Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Such crime has concentrated
the world's attention on the problems of post-Qaddafi Libya. The riots showcased both the
power of radical Islamist militias and the inability of the government in Tripoli to provide
security and maintain order across the country. Lawlessness and corruption are pervasive, and
fundamental questions about the structure and operation of Libyan political and economic
institutions remain unanswered.239
Despite subsequent Libyan government pledges to address threat at that time, the
Washington Post reported in October 2012 that, the “armed Islamist extremists are terrorizing
the eastern Libyan city of Darna.” 240
In Benghazi itself, as of February 2013, Islamist militias
had resumed control of the city’s entrance and two main hospitals. In Tripoli, in April 2013, a
bomb-laden vehicle destroyed half of the French embassy. 241
In addition, the armed Libyan
groups, including former Libyan military forces, Islamist, tribal and other militias, engaged in
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increasingly violent clashes, which resulted in significant civilian casualties in Benghazi in
June 2013 and in Tripoli in November 2013.242
Consequently, the GNC delegated the job of
creating a constitution to a new body, the Constitutional Assembly, elected after many delays
in February 2014.243
To sum-up, during the period 2011-2014, the government and the GNC of Libya were
subjected to repeated armed challenges by a number of militias from across Libya. “While
some of these groups are remnants of the civil war, other groups and alliances are new”.244
By early 2014, the GNC had almost ceased to function. Opponents of the ruling coalition
accused it of exploiting a law designed to purge Gadhafi-era officials from office to install
Islamists in their place. Similarly, “the GNC’s decision to create the militia alliance Libya
Shield, allegedly at a cost of 900 million Libyan dinars, was interpreted by opponents as an
attempt to form a parallel army”. 245
By May 2014, Libya had come to the brink of a new civil war, between liberals and
Islamists. That month, General Khalifa Hafter seized control of the air force to attack Islamist
militias in Benghazi, later expanding his targets to include the Islamist-dominated legislature
in Tripoli. 246
To explain, Fighting broke out in May when retired general Khalifa Haftar
marshalled an anti-Islamist alliance, Operation Dignity, composed of the Libyan National
Army (LNA) and allied militias and attacked Islamist Libya Shield militias in Benghazi.
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while calling for a snap elections for 25 June.248
Such elections were held to the House of
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Representatives (HOR), the successor assembly to the GNC whose mandate had expired.

249

(The original constitutional road map called for Congress to dissolve itself in February 2014,
but its Islamist majority voted itself a further year in office in December 2013.)250The
Elections did nothing to resolve the chaos. Most Libyans had already given up on democracy,
as voter turnout dropped from 1.7 million in the previous poll to just 630,000. Secular parties
declared victory and formed a new legislature, the House of Representatives, but the
Islamists, who got just 30 of 188 seat,251
refused to accept that outcome.
In July, an Islamist militia from the city of Misurata responded to Hifter’s actions by
attacking Tripoli, prompting Western embassies to evacuate. After a six-week battle, the
Islamists captured the capital in August on behalf of the so-called Libya Dawn coalition,
which, together with the defunct legislature, formed what they labelled a “national salvation
government.”

252

In October, the newly elected parliament, led by the secular Operation

Dignity coalition, fled to the eastern city of Tobruk, where it established a competing interim
government, which Libya’s Supreme Court later declared unconstitutional. Libya thus finds
itself with two warring governments, each controlling only a fraction of the country’s
territory and militias. 253
In other words, following the election, fighting escalated in Tripoli
and Benghazi, which forced the newly elected HOR to meet in the eastern city of Tobruk
rather than in Tripoli. Some GNC Members refused to accept the legitimacy of the HOR and
re-established the GNC as a rival legislative authority in Tripoli. In 2014, two rival Prime
Ministers and Governments emerged, with the HOR Government based in Tobruk and the
GNC Government based in Tripoli. Key state institutions remained in Tripoli, which led the
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HOR Government to create its own parallel institutions in Tobruk. Fighting between militias
linked to the HOR and the GNC continued throughout late 2014 and early 2015.254
On 26 July, US embassy staff were evacuated from Tripoli, followed by those of most
other embassies. Thousands of foreigners left by road, as well as on Italian air force transport
aircraft, and British, French and Greek warships. “On 24 August, Zintani units withdrew
from the airport, which was captured and burned by Misratan units commanded by politician
Salah Badhi. Islamists secured the rest of the capital.”255
According to the abovementioned developments, Libya has not only failed to evolve
into democracy; it has devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths and other human rights
abuses have increased several fold.256The Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has taken
advantage of the chaos to build series of bases in the country, “expanding its territory and
attracting growing numbers of recruits.”257
“The civil war between west and east has waxed
and waned with sporadic outbreaks of violence since 2014”. 258By spring 2016, the US
intelligence community estimated that there were “more than 6,000 ISIS fighters in Libya,
with the group’s ranks growing at an alarming rate.” 259
In April 2016, the former United
States President Barack Obama “described post-intervention Libya as a shit show”. 260
4.2 Intervention Abused: Reasons behind the deterioration of the situation in Libya post
international intervention
The question now is who should be blamed for the abovementioned deteriorations that
the Libyans have been suffering from since 2011, who is responsible for such chaos and
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instability. Starting with evaluating the international intervention in Libya in 2011, the
intervention exceeded its main mandate, which was to protect the civilians under threat, by
engaging in the process of the regime change.
To explain, as mentioned before, the UNSC resolution 1973 gave the international
community limited mandates in Libya, covering protecting “civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack” 261
, enforcing sanctions, including a no-fly zone and a
comprehensive arms embargo, and obtaining the “rapid and unimpeded passage of
humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel.”262
In addition, the military
objectives allowed are clearly defined in scope through permitting to resort to “all necessary
means” and allowing the intervening parties to protect both civilians and civilian populated
areas, both during actual attacks and under threat of attack. 263
Here, the main problem is that although the international intervention in Libya may
have been borne mainly from a desire to protect civilians, consistent with the UN Security
Council authorization, 264
within few weeks of the operation’s launch, the evidence showed
that the international community’s primary aim had evolved to overthrowing Qaddafi’s
regime, even at the expense of increasing harm to Libya’s civilians. 265
To explain,
rather than pursuing a ceasefire, the NATO and its allies aided the rebels; as on 4 March
2011, the United Kingdom declared its willingness to deploy military experts to advise the
rebels in eastern Libya, a step characterized as “a clear intervention on the ground to bolster
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the anti-Qaddafi uprising.”

266

In the mid of the same month, the former U.S. President

Barack Obama approved covert aid to the rebels. By April 6, the British military and
intelligence officials in Benghazi were helping the rebels establish a command structure and
defense ministry. Furthermore, by mid-April, Qatar was shipping French antitank missiles to
rebels in eastern Libya, and “the Obama administration secretly gave its blessing” 267to such
arms transfers. Then, by the next month, France started air-dropping weapons to opposition
forces in western Libya, who were being trained by operatives from France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom, as these countries later acknowledged to a UN panel. 268
The abovementioned assistance to the rebels significantly extended the war and
increased the harm to civilians, contrary to the intent of the UN authorization.269
To illustrate,
in view of the real development of the operations, it appears that the notion of civilian
protection was extended beyond its initial conception as expressed in the resolution, applying
military and political objectives that had only an indirect link to threats to the civilian
population. Indeed, it appeared that the military operations, at least in part, were aimed at
supporting the forces assembled by the NTC, in its efforts to overthrow the elements loyal to
the regime.270
Furthermore, after the threat of a massacre in Benghazi had been ruled out, but
with actions by Qaddafi’s troops against other cities continuing, the operations entrusted to
the NATO continued, “with an increasingly blurred line between the prevention of massacres
on the one hand and, on the other, a systematic air campaign that aimed to dismantle the
military apparatus and whose ultimate goal was regime change.”271
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In addition to arming the rebels, other actions were initiated, such as “sending military
advisors to rebels; financial support through the creation of a fund supplied, in part, by the
regime’s frozen assets; repeated and solemn calls for Qaddafi’s departure; growing
recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel movement represented by the NTC.”272It became
clear over the months that the coalition’s objective was the collapse of the Qaddafi regime,
finally considering this objective as one of the necessary measures to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack. The increasing pressure from NATO and its
air raids not only weakened the offensive capacity of loyalist forces but also gradually
undermined their ability to respond to the actions of the armed opposition.273
As such, the rebels took Tripoli, with the support of NATO in August, signaling the
end of the Qaddafi’s regime, who was captured and killed by rebels in the end of October.
Following the death of Al Qaddafi, the US former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated
“we came, we saw, he died”274
, reflected the enthusiasm of the international community to
see the end of the Qaddafi’s regime. The abovementioned actions capture the manner in
which an intervention meant to stop an immanent humanitarian crisis transformed into an act
of regime change, which was more expansive and consequential.275
The Libyan case showed
that the protection of civilians was open to a very broad interpretation, going far beyond its
originally declared objectives and provoking a strong, though expected, reaction from those
governments, Russia and China, that felt they had been forced into not opposing the adoption
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of Resolution 1973.276NATO took actions that were unnecessary or inconsistent with
protecting civilians, but which fostered regime change. 277
If NATO had prioritized the
protection of civilians, in accordance with its authorization, the transatlantic alliance
would have enforced the no fly zone, bombed forces that were threatening civilians, and
attempted to forge a cease-fire.278
However its assistance to the rebels significantly extended
the war and intensified the harm to civilians, contrary to the intent of the UN authorization.279
4.2.1 International Intervention in Libya and States’ Self-interests: Oil, Prestige, and
Refugees
Furthermore, in spite of the concerns raised by the five abstaining UNSC member
states on resolution 1973, regarding the way of implementation, limitations, outcome, post
intervention stage, etc., France, the United Kingdom and the United States decided to swiftly
intervene in Libya, directly after the adoption of the resolution, while neglecting all the raised
concerns.
As such, questions regarding the incentives behind such quick response of the intervening
countries in the case of Libya have to be highlighted; as was the intervention for the sake of
protecting civilians under threat, or there were other factors that encouraged the three leading
countries, France, UK and US, to take such decision. In this context, the following section
will reflect that the political considerations and the state’s self/national interests; such oil,
prestige, and countering refugees flow, were the main motives behind the intervention of the
three countries.
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A. France:
France and the United Kingdom have led the charge on the intervention in Libya. For
a month, both pushed the international community toward an intervention, ultimately penning
U.N. Security Council resolution 1973 authorizing the no-fly zone on March 17. Paris and
London’s interests in waging war on Libya are not the same, and Libya carries different
weight with each.
To explain, starting with France, its initial response to the 15 February outbreak of
violence in Libya was caution. When asked about reports of more than 200 deaths in a week
of fighting, Laurent Wauqiez of the French Foreign Ministry said that “our true
preoccupation is to assure the security of French citizens in Libya and that, though the Libyan
government’s violence was unacceptable, France would ‘not engage in any interference”.

280

On 23 February, Sarkozy said the Qaddafi government’s brutal and bloody repression of
civilians was revolting. Three days later France’s Ambassador to the UN, Gerard Araud,
labelled the Al Qaddafi government’s repression brutal and bloody and noted that ‘crimes
against humanity may have been committed. On 8 March France’s former ambassador to
Libya reminded the National Assembly of the Qaddafi regime’s 1996 massacre of over 1200
inmates in a Tripoli prison. The ambassador went on to note that the opposition’s momentum
had slowed, suggesting the need for a rapid response.281By 19 March the Sarkozy
government had taken “a radically different path: it was the first country to engage in military
intervention against the Qaddafi’s regime. France deployed roughly 60 aircraft and engaged
in approximately 5600 sorties”.282
Aside from the announced goal of protecting the civilians under threat, there were
other national interest behind France’s enthusiasm to intervene in Libya, as “France motives
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were linked to reviving “the French grandeur” through Sarkosy's wish to promote the image
of France on a domestic and international level; in addition to his political self-interest” 283
.
Starting with the president’s self-interest, Sarkozy wanted to improve his image domestically
and gain the public’s support. According to public opinion polls, Nicolas Sarkozy’s
popularity was

low

in

February-march and continued to fall steadily. polls show that

Sarkozy’s domestic policy evokes the greatest discontent among the population. Experts
identify two main groups of causes of the president’s rapidly falling rating: first of all, the
reaction to reforms aimed at adapting French society to the challenges of globalism (raising
the retirement age, cutting spending on education, and optimizing military expenditures) and,
secondly, the consequences of the international financial and economic crisis that has had a
painful impact on the French economy284
.
In addition, the ruling government and the French President Nicholas Sarkozy were
under huge political pressure in early 2011. The failure in handling the emerging 'Arab
Spring,' the dismissal of the French Foreign Minister because she was suspected of
corruption, and controversial links to the Tunisian Ben Ali regime before the popular uprising
and general discontent with the government politics led to a large decrease in the popularity
of Nicholas Sarkozy. 285
An interim peak of this development was reached when an opinion
poll predicted on 5 March 2011 that Sarkozy had fallen back to position three for the 2012
Presidential election, beaten by the far-right candidate and the socialist candidate. Especially,
the popularity of the right-wing candidate was politically dangerous for Sarkozy, because
Sarkozy's own party constantly lost its supporters to them.286
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Sarkozy’s government had fumbled its initial response to the uprisings in Tunisia, and
was eager for an opportunity to show it stood with traditional French liberal values of liberty
and human rights, as well as to demonstrate France’s continued relevance on the global stage
in an election year.287
As such Sarkozy saw the intervention in Libya a good opportunity to
try to regain the public’s support. He believed that being part of the intervention and taking
the lead for it would be a great opportunity that can help decrease the criticism surrounding
him due to his inadequate response to the uprising in both Tunisia and Egypt. 288
France also wanted to reassert its role as a great European power especially due to the
financial crisis and the growing image that Germany is taking over the decisions in the
European Union. As such, prestige seems to have played an initial causal role in the Sarkozy
government’s decision. Sarkozy’s government, like those before it, worked to maintain their
country’s prestige. French diplomats explain their country’s leadership role in the Libyan
crisis as driven by their historical position of influence on the African continent. That
historical position led to an expectation that France would act, which seems to have played a
critical role in Sarkozy’s decision to agree to Bernard-Henri Levy’s proposal to meet with
and recognize the TNC. Analysts also note that as of March 2011 France’s position of
influence in Africa had been weakened by its failure to take the side of protestors in Egypt
and Tunisia. A New York Times editorial concluded that Sarkozy “saw Libya as a chance to
recoup French prestige in North Africa, a region France has long considered important to its
economy and security.”289
Furthermore, the threat to France’s borders posed by refugees fleeing violence in
Libya was another important initial factor. As violence in Libya spread, French officials
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concerns about the migratory threat grew. In a 25 February press conference Sarkozy
expressed his concern about the destabilizing effects of the massive flight of foreigners in
Libya towards the Tunisian and Egyptian borders. On 2 March, the former French Foreign
Minister, Alain Juppe ́ told the National Assembly that “helping Libya, Tunisia and Egypt
towards the right path was in our interest wherein the goal is a level of political and economic
development that permits the citizens of the South to live at home, on their land, in their
country.” 290
On 11 March, Sarkozy noted that 200,000 people had fled violence in Libya and
asked, if conditions did not improve, “what would be the temptation of these displaced
persons? They would not have a choice: it would be to cross the Mediterranean.”291
French officials believed that because of its location instability in Libya and at its
borders would have negative consequences for France. Sarkozy explained that the EU reacted
robustly to the Libyan crisis “because we are geographical neighbors and we are, therefore,
among the first impacted and affected”292
. When a journalist pointed out to Laurent
Wauquiez that Italy faced a flood of refugees from Libya he replied “France is in the exact
same position ... Libya is the funnel of Africa: countries like Liberia, Somalia, and Eritrea
have flows of illegal immigration that pass through Libya, it is a true risk for Europe”.293
France’s former ambassador to Libya noted with regard to migratory flows from Libya that
‘the sooner things stabilize; the better things will be.”294
France is the home for many Libyan exiles, many of whom had connections within
the French establishment and were keen for a change in Libya, they pressured the French
decision makers to intervene in the conflict. As the conflict escalated the French will to
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intervene in the conflict became higher. However, for the French the conflict in Libya was
not just a situation where they cared about the civilians, it was also a situation where France
could enhance their national interest and Sarkozy could enhance his own political interests.295
Furthermore, maintaining access to Libyan oil was an important contributing factor in
the Sarkozy government’s decision. France’s special interest in Libya has stemmed from the
fact that the country has the largest proven reserves of oil and gas in North Africa. Although
oil imports by France from Libya have been limited in recent years, their share in the total
French oil imports has steadily grown. French oil imports from Norway have fallen, while
imports from Libya have increased. In 2008, Libya rose from sixth to fifth place among
France’s oil suppliers. Whereas Libya supplied almost ten times less oil than Norway,
France’s leading oil supplier, in 2000, the difference fell to a factor of two in 2008. “70% of
the exported oil was produced in the east of the country, where the uprising broke out. Until
the beginning of unrest in Libya, France got not only oil but also gas through the LibyanItalian gas pipeline green stream. The French energy giant gaz de France Suez was involved
in developing the Libyan gas fields”.296Zaki Laidi wrote in mid-March that France and
others faced the risk that if they did nothing Qaddafi would “re-emerge with more violence
against his people and probably also against governments that opposed him.”297
B: The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom was the second country after France to call the United Nations
to impose a no-fly zone over Libya to protect the civilians. Sarkozy has gained the support of
British Prime Minister David Cameron, who, after initial hesitation, also spoke out clearly
against the Libyan regime’s repression.298As the violence in Libya grew, the Cameron
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government was initially reluctant to act, refusing to support EU sanctions against the
Qaddafi’s regime. Within less than a month, however, the Cameron government had joined
its French ally in playing a leading role in what would be termed Operation Unified Protector.
“The United Kingdom deployed 37 aircraft, which, starting on 19 March, engaged in more
than 3000 sorties in the course of the air campaign. Why did the Cameron government take
such initial action as condemning the Qaddafi’s regime and calling for a no-fly zone? Why
did it ultimately choose to use force against the Libyan regime?”299
London had set three conditions which had to be met before an intervention: there had
to be (1) a demonstrable need; (2) legal basis, and; (3) regional support. 300
Most frequently
referred to in the government’s official statements is the responsibility to protect the Libyan
people. Prime Minister Cameron and many of his fellow party members had vivid memories
from past failures to act in genocides such as Srebrenica and Rwanda. There was now a sense
that Britain could not sit idle on the sidelines, especially given its role as a major European
power. 301
In making the humanitarian case for intervention Cameron was asked about why
Britain was not intervening in other cases where rights were abused. Cameron responded by
stressing that he favored intervention where both moral concerns and national interest called
for it: “just because we cannot do the right thing everywhere does not mean we should not do
it when we have clear permission for and a national interest in doing so”. 302
Furthermore, the refugee threat was a critical initial factor and economic interests and
terrorism became important contributing factors as soon as the Cameron government took
initial action. Analysts and policy-makers made the case for British intervention by
combining the migration, economic interests, and terrorism logics. All the statements that
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follow were made after the Cameron government’s 28 February support for a no-fly zone and
call for Qaddafi to leave power. On 4 March an Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
press release estimated that almost 200,000 refugees had fled Libya since the uprising
began.303
The Financial Times’ Philip Stephens argued that “Economics, energy security and
immigration controls all point in the same direction” 304
. James Blitz reported that Cameron’s
hardening stance on Libya was rooted in a fear that if Qaddafi remained in power “the fear is
he will go back to being the recruiting sergeant for terror he was in the 1980s.”305
On 14 March, David Cameron stated that the “inaction would lead Libya to become a
failed pariah state threatening to flood Britain with refugees and menace it with terror.”

306

The next day William Hague, the former UK Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs,
“concluded a Commons speech with a similar statement: if Libya was to be left as a pariah
state, particularly after these recent events with Al Qaddafi running amok exacting reprisals
on his own people, estranged from the rest of the world, as a potential source for terrorism in
the future, that would be a danger to the national interest of this country.” 307
The terror and
migration logics were also central to the government’s major statements on Libya just before
and just after the air campaign began. Cameron concluded his 18 March speech by noting that
allowing Qaddafi ’s violent crackdown to continue would not:308
“be in Britain’s interests. Let us be clear where our interests lie. In this country we
know what Colonel Qaddafi is capable of. We should not forget his support for
the biggest terrorist atrocity on British soil. We simply cannot have a situation
where a failed pariah state festers on Europe’s southern border. This would
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potentially threaten our security, push people across the Mediterranean and create
a more dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for all our allies as well as
for the people of Libya.” 309
Furthermore, British prestige was not implicated in the Libya crisis until it chose to
take a leadership role on 28 February. In taking initial action, however, the Cameron
government implicated British prestige such that it had to intervene, or its prestige would
have suffered. On 28 February, Hague attended the UN Human Rights Council and was
successful in the effort to have Libya removed from the Council. The same day the former
Prime Minister told the Commons, “Britain is taking a lead. Over the weekend, we secured
agreement for a UN Security Council resolution which we had drafted, and which is
unusually strong, unanimous and includes all of our proposals”. 310
On 9 March, Cameron stated that “we have led the way in getting a tough UN
resolution on Libya, getting Libya thrown out of the Human Rights Council and making sure
that the world is preparing for every eventuality, including a no-fly zone” 311
. Getting
UNSCR 1973 passed required that the British and French put their prestige on the line. The
Cameron government clearly felt that its leadership was worth drawing attention to. “It is
likely that the government recognized that its international prestige would have suffered had
it not continued with an aggressive stance”. 312
The United Kingdom motives were also linked to energy interests. Libya seems a
profitable market to exploit especially after the loss incurred due to “the mismanagement of
BP, resulting in the Macando well disaster in the Gulf of Mexico”. 313Britain energy sector
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would benefit from new deals with the rebels in Libya. For the United Kingdom, Libya offers
a promise of energy exploitation. It was not a country with which London had a strong clientpatron relationship at that moment, but it hoped it could be developed if Al Gadhafi were
removed from power.314
In addition, the British motivation has to a large extent been driven by the same
prestige logic as the French, but even more importantly by the ambition of preserving the
close strategic relationship315with its allies by actively supporting their strategic line.
Washington’s call for someone else to take lead in Libya likely played a role. It is possible
that the UK was eager to step up to those demands in order to preserve its ‘Special
Relationship’ with the US. It has been suggested that independent judgement and action on
the part of the UK was a way for London to prove that it remained relevant in its relationship
with Washington. 316
Moreover, Cameron, for his part, was equally eager to demonstrate his
leadership on security issues in the wake of domestic criticism of his planned defence cuts
that had been announced the previous fall. In addition, both countries saw an opportunity to
test the defence cooperation treaties they had signed only a few months earlier.317
Furthermore, in contrast to France, the position of the UK was initially more hesitant,
though it evolved quickly thereafter. Initially, the UK referred to the NTC as an “important
and legitimate political interlocutor.”318By May 2011, however, the UK referred to it as ‘a
legitimate representative of the Libyan people’ and, at the end of June of that same year, it
viewed the NTC as “the legitimate representative of the Libyan people”. 319
The development
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of the terms in which the UK referred to the NTC expresses different levels of support.320
C. The United States:
Although the interest of the United States in Libya was not as France and the United
Kingdom; the United States decided to support its allies in their intervention; in which there
were many factors behind such decision; aside from the protection of the civilians under
threat. To explain, the impetus for the intervention in Libya came in large part from France
and Britain. Although President Obama supported the operation, he emphasized to his French
and British counterparts that they would be expected to take the lead and bear as much of the
cost as they could. “The United States would support the effort, but provide only those
capabilities it uniquely possessed. This arrangement also set the stage for a much-reduced
U.S. role after the war.”321
In addition, in the text of a letter from the president to the speaker of the House of
Representatives and the president prop-tempore of the senate on March 21, 2011 declared
that “The United States has not deployed ground forces into Libya. United States forces are
conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect
civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster. Accordingly, U.S. forces have targeted the
Qaddafi regime's air defense systems, command and control structures, and other capabilities
of Qaddafi's armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated areas. We will seek a
rapid, but responsible, transition of operations to coalition, regional, or international
organizations that are postured to continue activities as may be necessary to realize the
objectives of U.N. Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973”.322
In this context, some analysts view the US engagement in Libya as a sort of payback
to its European allies for their contribution in Afghanistan, something which also Secretary of
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State Clinton implied in the quote below.323“We asked our NATO allies to go into
Afghanistan with us 10 years ago […] They have been there, and a lot of them have been
there despite the fact that they were not attacked. The attack came on us…they stuck with us.
When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO
allies…this was in their vital national interest.”324
Another possible motive for why Washington decided to act was that Libya was seen
as threatening to destabilize the region. Libya was in 2006 removed from the US blacklist of
states supporting terrorism after having abandoned its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
program and renounced terrorism. The US upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an
Embassy and, in 2008, Rice was the first US Secretary of State to visit Libya since 1953. The
fighting in Libya ignited fears that the country once again would become a base for terrorists
or that Qaddafi would resume the development of weapons of mass destruction. Qaddafi’s
role in the Lockerbie bombing may also have been in policy makers’ minds. 325
4.2.2 State Fragility during and post Qaddafi Era
The international community should be blamed for not taking into consideration the
personalist ruling regime of Al Qaddafi, and the internal situation in Libya, before taking the
decision of the intervention, or when deciding to be involved in fostering the regime change
or even before ending the intervention after the death of Al Qaddafi.
To explain, the ouster of Al Qaddafi liberated Libya from four decades of
authoritarian rule, but left a legacy of weak institutional capacity, based on the personality
nature of his regime. Barbara Geddes describes the personalist regime as a system that
“depends much more on the discretion of an individual leader. The leader may be an officer
and may have created a party to support himself, but neither the military nor the party
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exercises independent decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler.”3
Indeed when studying the ruling system in Libya under Al Qaddafi, Libya was ruled by a
personalist regime, as all the decisions were taken only by its leader. Al Qaddafi’s strategy
relies on weakening the institutional system, strengthening the tribal system, in order to
maintain power and control over the country. As such when the NATO ended its mission in
the country, Libya was left with no institutions capable to manage the post intervention stage.
The specific feature of Libya at that time was “the complete absence of an institutional
national framework: state institutions were ignored, neglected, or destroyed by Al Qaddafi for
four decades.”327
Consequently, the lack of the efficient institutional system in Libya resulted
in serious problems to the transitional and interim government.
To explain, Libya’s inability to control its own territory following the death of Al
Qaddafi was a direct result of the system of governance Al Qaddafi implemented while in
power, known as Jamahiriya. Due to the substantial income from oil, the Qaddafi’s regime
was able to use funds to implement a strong patronage network, ensure that bureaucratic
institutions remained weak, and empower tribal and local leaders to typical governmental
services such as rule of law.

328

In addition, the socialist institutions that were meant to

provide goods and services to the population were intentionally suppressed or mismanaged to
ensure no one sector of government became too powerful.329The promotion under the
Qaddafi’s regime was based on allegiance to the “Brother Leader” himself and favored the
loyal over the capable; as the result, Libya lacked the trained civil service to manage and
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administer governance.330
Fundamentally, Jamahiriya strengthened the centralized power of
Al Qaddafi and diffused remaining authority at the lowest levels of society, which resulted in
the marginalization of political elites who might otherwise have challenged Qaddafi’s rule.331
Furthermore, the Key security/military and economic positions, “the only centralized
and skeletal institutions that existed in Libya, were filled by Qaddafi’s close aides by
systematically using political familialism or tribalism, i.e. key individuals recruited according
to familial, tribal, ethnic belongings or alliances, in the first place the Qadhadhfa, the
Magarha and (at least until a coup attempt in 1993) one of the greatest tribe of central Libya,
the Warfalla.” 332“And this small elite, what Libyans called Rijal al-Khayma (the men of the
tent), controlled a web of families, tribes or allied ethnic groups with army colonels,
petroleum engineers, police officers, and high bureaucrats recruited according to familial/
tribal equilibriums at the local level.” 333
“Orchestrated chaos, de-institutionalization and the
plethora of local institutions were a way to keep exclusive power at the top in the hands of Al
Qaddafi and his network/clique who managed the system from above”.334
In the same context, the actual military suffered from poor professionalization,
outdated or ill-maintained equipment, and overall lack of leadership. Positions within the
military were not only shuffled around to the extent that service members did not know their
bosses and supervisors did not know their subordinates, but were assigned based on tribal and
personal affiliations with Brother Leader. Following the 1993 coup attempt by a combination
of Islamists and military members, Al Qaddafi ensured that no promotions would be made
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beyond his own “rank” of colonel. The problems surrounding the police forces were similar
to those of the armed forces: lack of discipline, equipment, and training.

335

Aside from

Qaddafi ’s personal revolutionary-guard force, the police and armed forces were primarily
used to achieve political goals, not to secure the territory and the citizens.336
Under Qaddafi, the military structures of the Libyan state were almost wholly
subordinated to the political structures of his regime. That subordination of state to politics
allowed the self-declared “Brother Leader” to pursue a range of coup-proofing strategies in
the 1970s and 1980s, which were based around a logic of patronage (to control key military
units) and neglect (to enfeeble the National Army as a whole). These two tactics of control
gave rise to state security apparatus in which the most potential elements of the National
army were led by Qaddafi’s son or his close allies.
To sum-up, Qaddafi ’s vision of institutional development employed two opposing
forces. On one hand, he wanted to transform “Libya into a bastion for his regional ambitions”
of Pan-Arabism, and on the other, “Al Qaddafi’s concerns for security and dominance”
prevented the establishment of any institutions with true power, authority, or influence. This
weakened political/military, economic, and social institutions.337
In this context, Libya’s weak institutions led to two destructive situations: first, the
co-opting of tribal militias by the interim government to provide security for population
centers and major resources; and second, the rise of opportunistic tribal militias and spread of
internal violence. Islamist organizations are an amalgamation of these two scenarios. They
tend to be tribally heterogeneous; they were at times co-opted by the government; and they
are opportunistic. Furthermore, “the inability of Islamist organizations to align with a major
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tribe for logistical or operational support and their nature has led some Islamist organizations,
such as the Abu Mahjen Battalion, to acquire resources through criminal means, such as
kidnapping for ransom and armed robbery of money transports”338
In 2011, the Qaddafi’s regime collapsed gradually, leaving a void, namely an
institutional tabula rasa meaning that new authorities were not confronted with the problem
of remaining parts of the former regime and a large officer corps acting as stakeholders as in
Egypt or Yemen. What came out was a proliferation of actors organized along familial, tribal,
ethnic, regional lines, a surge of localism, far from the revival of a tradition of organized civil
society that did not exist in Libya.339
In addition to weak institutional capacity and a lack of
experience with democratic processes, Libya is also saddled with the internal rivalries and
distrust purposefully instigated by the Qaddafi’s regime as a means of maintaining control. In
his effort to maintain control, Qaddafi pursued a “divide and rule” policy, pitting community
against community, tribe against tribe, and region against region. As in other post-conflict
situations, even when these internal divisions were cultivated by rulers or external powers,
they often cast a long shadow.340
Moreover, Libya suffered from the lack of democracy during Qaddafi’s era. While
Qaddafi claimed his regime was based on popular will, it systematically suppressed civil
society and independent media, prohibited the establishment of political parties, and created a
web of unelected bodies and informal power structures.341
As such the fall of Al Gadhafi “as
Libya’s strongman and purveyor of the patronage network left a power vacuum,”342
in which

3

3
8
Alija, Basic. “Libya: A Contemporary
Conflict in a failing State.” Master's
thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School,
2015. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45160/15Mar_Basic_Alija.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
3
3
9
Droz-Vincent, Philippe. “Competitive
Statehood in Libya: Governing Differently
a Specific Setting or Deconstructing Its Weak Sovereign
State with a Fateful Drift Toward Chaos?” Small Wars & Insurgencies. May 11, 2018. https://www-tandfonlinecom.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592318.2018.1455322?needAccess=true
3
4
0
Chivvis, Christopher S., Keith Crane,
Peter Mandaville, and Jeffrey Martini.
“Libya’s Post-Qaddafi Transition The Nation-Building
Challenge.”
National
Security
Research
Division.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR129/RAND_RR129.pdf.
3
4
1
Chivvis, Christopher S., Keith Crane,
Peter Mandaville, and Jeffrey Martini.
“Libya’s Post-Qaddafi Transition The Nation-Building
Challenge.”
National
Security
Research
Division.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR129/RAND_RR129.pdf.
3
4
2
Alija, Basic. “Libya: A Contemporary Conflict in a failing State.” Master's thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School,
2015. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45160/15Mar_Basic_Alija.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

91

government institutions were too weak to provide security to the population, and from a more
pragmatic standpoint, unable to provide security for Libya’s natural resources.343
To sum-up, this chapter was divided into two sections, the first one gave an overview
to the deteriorating situation in Libya post the international intervention in 2011, while
arguing that the intervention intensified the sufferings and harmfulness to the civilians in the
country. As such the second section of the chapter focused on explaining the reasons behind
such deteriorations, while clarifying that the abuse of the humanitarian intervention and the
fragility of the Libyan state are the main reasons behind the collapse of Libya.
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VI. Conclusion
5.1 The Findings of the Research:
The main aim of this research was to study the dilemma of the humanitarian
intervention through focusing on evaluating the outcome of the international intervention and
analyzing the factors contributed to its success/failure, in the case of Libya, rather focusing
on its legality, ethics, morality, types and intervening actors; in order to figure out whether
the international intervention helps in protecting civilians under threat or it leads to an
increase in the sufferings, deterioration and threats facing them. Libya was the only country
of the Arab Spring 2011, where the UNSC permitted the international military intervention.
The international intervention in Libya is considered a test case for the principle of the
responsibility to protect and a turning point in its history, as the international intervention was
permitted in the state, by the UNSC, for the first time without the consent of its government.
In addition, the intervention’s aftermath changed the debates on the principle from focusing
on the implementation of the international intervention into focusing on its outcome.
Indeed, the findings of this research reflected how the international community was
committed, in the case of Libya, to react when there was a demonstrable need and
international calls for a reaction; as the international community was keen from the beginning
of the popular uprising in Libya in 2011, to respond to the Libyan regime’s use of violence
against the domestic unrest and anti-governmental demonstrations. To explain, the
international community’s response went quickly from the political condemnation, to
diplomatic pressure, to a UNSC-authorization to, NATO-led, military intervention under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
But was the quick military intervention in the case of Libya a right decision? The use
of military intervention for the sake of protecting civilians under threat, is always a
controversial issue among the international community; various concerns and debates raised
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regarding this type of intervention and its implications throughout history; as such it always
has to be the last choice of the international community. In the case of Libya, the military
intervention was initially portrayed as a humanitarian success to the international community
for preventing a bloodbath in that country’s second largest city, Benghazi. Accordingly, the
proponents of the intervention in Libya claimed that the intervention was a triumph to the
successful implementation of the principle of the responsibility to protect. In this regards, the
top U.S. representatives to the transatlantic alliance declared that “NATO's operation in
Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention.” 344
However, later on, Libya started
suffering from severe insecurity and internal deterioration that not only have increased the
threats to the civilians in Libya, but to the international community as well. To explain, in
spite of the international abovementioned efforts to protect civilians under threat, the
situation in Libya has rapidly been deteriorated, after the end of the international intervention.
In the post intervention phase, as abovementioned, Libya has been characterized by state
collapse, chaos and anarchy, with conflict between ever-changing alliances of armed groups,
terrorism with the expansion of the Islamic State and uncontrolled borders with waves of
migrants crossing the boarders of the country.
In this context, after studying the case of the intervention in Libya, this research
concluded that the international intervention has to be considered a failure of the international
community, as it led to the spread of instability in the country and to an increase in the threat
to the civilians. This research argues that there are two main factors behind such findings; one
of which is the abuse to the principle of the humanitarian intervention in Libya. To explain,
the international community exceeded the permitted mandate by taking actions that were
inconsistent with its main target, of protecting the civilians under threat in Libya, by engaging
in the process of fostering regime change; while allowing the political considerations and the
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states’ national interests of the intervening countries, such as oil and counter migration, to be
the main driver and incentive behind their decisions of intervening in Libya as explained
before in the previous chapter. Furthermore, this research argues that the fragility of the
Libyan state was the other factor behind the collapse of the state, as it led to the
intensification of the deteriorated situation in Libya post the international intervention in
2011. To explain, as all the institutions used to be under the control of Al Qaddafi and his
regime before the popular uprising; by the removal of the regime, Al Qaddafi left Libya with
a legacy of weak institutional capacity, based on the personal nature of his regime. In the post
intervention phase, Libya was lacking the functioning state structure; consequently, this led
the country to face a high level of instability, and inability to control the armed militias that
spread in the country after the intervention. The lack of the efficient institutional system in
Libya was not taken into consideration by the international community, either when deciding
to engaging in fostering the regime change process or when deciding to end their role after
the death of Al Qaddafi; subsequently, resulting in increasing the harmfulness to the civilians
in Libya and being considered as one of the main factor behind the collapse of the state,
beside the factor that was already mentioned above, which is the abuse of the humanitarian
intervention.
5.2The Instability Continues Despite the International Efforts and Political Agreements:
Since then, although the international community has been trying to exert much effort
to return the stability to Libya and end the chaos, all its attempts are ending up with no good,
and nobody can predict when this will be achieved. To clarify, since the fall of Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has suffered from years of ineffective and dysfunctional
rule. Moreover, a series of weak governments passed through Tripoli in the aftermath of the
popular uprising as powerful militias struggled for control on the ground. The country further
disintegrated in 2014, “when a contested election saw Islamist-backed politicians and allied
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militias seize power in the western capital of Tripoli and force the newly elected House of
Representatives to flee to the east, where it allied with eastern anti-Islamist forces. Despite
the UN-led agreement that installed a Government of National Accord (GNA) in 2016, rival
factions across the country continue to fight one another.” 345Unsurprisingly, the Islamic
State (or ISIS) and other resurgent jihadist groups have taken advantage of the country’s
political instability, effectively “turning Libya into a safe haven and breeding ground for
extremists”.346
Furthermore, the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which the United Nations relied
on and described as a “ﬁrst step” towards ending the country’s crisis,347
has failed to put an
end to the instability in Libya. To explain, on December 17th 2015, Rival Libyan politicians
signed a deal in Skhirat, Morocco to form a unity government despite opposition on both
sides348
. That agreement, aimed at “ending the fighting between Libya’s so-called Dawn and
Dignity factions, produced the Government of National Accord in Tripoli but was unable to
unify Libya’s fragmented political, economic, and military bodies.” 349
“The conception and
execution of dialogue in the lead-up to the deal was rushed at the behest of outside powers
and, more important, it was artificially structured as a deal between two parties when in fact
the conflict’s actors were more numerous and diverse.” By relying on signatories from the
two parliaments, one in the east and one in the west of the country, “who did not speak for
the actual forces on the ground, it set the stage for continued gridlock. A crucial sticking
point was the authority of the commander in chief of the armed forces, which the agreement
gave to the GNA’s Presidency Council, a stipulation rejected by Haftar and his
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supporters.” 350
To surmount this gridlock, the new UN envoy in Libya, Ghassan Salamé, proposed an
“action plan consisting of amendments to the LPA (to include a reconstituted Presidency
Council), a national conference, a popular referendum on the constitution, and the preparation
of presidential and parliamentary elections with appropriate voting laws.” However, such
plan has been stuck on nearly every stage, as there “is no movement on revising the makeup
of the council; progress on the national conference, which the UN outsourced to a
nongovernmental organization, has been slow and fitful; and the eastern House of
Representatives won’t put the constitutional referendum law to a vote. That leaves elections
as the last remaining pillar.” 351
“Salamé long argued that elections could take place only once
the conditions were ripe. Now, although no headway has been made, elections are to be held
regardless, in December 2018, according to France’s initiative.” 352
In brief, after a comprehensive examining of the international intervention in the case
of Libya 2011, and the followed current deteriorating situation, no one can predict how and
when it will end; also, many questions have been raised regarding the principle of the
humanitarian intervention, and the future of the responsibility to protect civilians. Regarding
the case of Libya intervention, it is a great proof that the principle might be good as an idea,
while its implementation has many negative consequences, as it was not purely used for
humanitarian purposes and as such can backfire, like what happened in Libya where the
outcome showed that the intervention brought even worse humanitarian disasters.
5.3 Lessons Learnt for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention:
In this context, it is worth to highlight that the NATO’s experience in Libya offers
important lessons for the future of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect.
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Each of its stages provide different lesson that should be taken into consideration in the future
when implementing the concept. Starting with the pre-intervention stage, as mentioned
above, resolution 1973 was adopted within days from the eruption of the popular uprising.
The resolution requested the international community to impose a no fly zone over Libya and
allowed to take all necessary measures; although the phrase opened the doors for the military
intervention to take place, the international community should have according to the third
pillar of the R2P imposed the no-fly zone first, before deciding to intervene militarily;
especially as there was a lack of a coherent vision regarding the implementation process.
Moreover, the rush to intervene to protect civilians meant that NATO became inadvertently
engaged in an intervention without a coherent vision and with limited understanding of the
political, public relations, and reconstruction activities that would be required in order to
achieve a desirable outcome.353The NATO and the international community were plunged
into action prior to answering the primary question highlighted by the UNSC members;
specially Russia and China regarding the way of implementing the resolution and protecting
civilians under threat. As such, during the implementation process the international
community was reluctant to decide when to end its mission and it got involved in fostering
regime change; as the result, the intervention ended up with a spread of instability in the
country. Libya’s most crucial lesson therefore is that the intervention requires a full agreed
coherent plan that covers all the stages of the intervention: the entrance, way of
implementation and exit strategy; as even the most limited engagements can quickly creep
toward something much bigger. This alone is not a reason against intervention, but rather a
caveat to take full responsibility for the action.354
Additionally, during the intervention stage, the intervening countries went beyond the
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permitted mandate. Although the intervention should have been limited to what the UNSC
member states have agreed on and allowed in the endorsed resolutions; the international
community went beyond their main mandate by engaging in fostering regime change, which
results in increasing the harmfulness of the civilians. To explain, the intervention initially
motivated by the desire to protect civilians is prone to expanding its objective to include
regime change, even if doing so magnifies the danger to civilians, contrary to the interveners’
original intent. That is partly because intervening states, when justifying their use of force to
domestic and international audiences, demonize the regime of the country they are targeting.
This demonization later inhibits the interveners from considering a negotiated settlement that
would permit the regime or its leaders to retain some power, which typically would be the
quickest way to end the violence and protect noncombatants.

355

By demanding regime

change, the interveners perversely encourage the regime to fight to the bitter end, which
actually escalates and prolongs the war, maximizing the harm to civilians. 356
Such lessons
from NATO's use of force in Libya suggest the need for considerable caution and a
comprehensive exploration of alternatives when contemplating if and how to conduct
humanitarian military intervention.357
Moreover, the other learnt lesson from the intervention in Libya is that the
intervention can backfire. To explain, any action, whether limited or extensive, carries some
undesirable, yet fairly predictable consequences on the ground. Intervention will empower
certain groups over others even when the stated intentions are different. A simple no-fly zone
engineered to help the rebels and their political institutions can actually end up strengthening
actors other than the ones policymakers intended to support. For example, in Libya the no-fly
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zone was supposed to strengthen the rebel leadership of the National Transitional Council
(NTC) and the other Benghazi-based political actors. In reality, the no-fly zone strengthened
the spontaneously formed militias that arose in other places, such as Zintan and Misrata,
because they were able to turn the tables on Qaddafi by using the no-fly zone as if it were the
rebel’s air force. These cities militias developed the requisite fighting skills, command
structures, and strategy to use NATO air power to their advantage while the forces of the
NTC did not. And because they put themselves at the frontlines, NATO needed to protect and
coordinate

with

them,

thereby

building

up

the

political

credentials

of

these

militias.358
Consequently, the radical Islamist groups, suppressed under Qaddafi, emerged as
the fiercest rebels during the war and refused to disarm or submit to government authority
afterward359
and Libya’s post-conflict security apparatus was comprised of a patchwork of
rebellions forces a and a mixture of militias that held power and control over particular
areas.360As such, humanitarian intervention can backfire by escalating rebellion 361in a
country and elsewhere. It encourages sub state groups to believe that by provoking state
retaliation they can attract intervention to help achieve their political objectives, up to and
include regime change. Typically, however, the escalation of rebellion magnifies the harm to
civilians before intervention can protect them, if it ever does. As a result, the prospect of
humanitarian intervention to protect civilians may perversely imperial them- a dynamic akin
to moral hazard.362
Furthermore, Former US President Obama and his British and French counterparts
asserted that the NATO-led operation had prevented a bloodbath and that tens of thousands of
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lives had been protected. Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur similarly wrote that tens of
thousands of lives, in Benghazi and elsewhere, were almost certainly saved by the
intervention. The US Permanent Representative of NATO and the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe also claimed that the operation saved tens of thousands of lives from
almost certain destruction. All of these assertions, however, have rested on counterfactual
assumptions that are easily called into question. For example, based on a different set of
assumptions, Alan Kuperman estimates that the Libyan conflict would have lasted six weeks
and inflicted 1,100 deaths had NATO not intervened, considerably fewer than the numbers
cited above. There is no way to resolve this debate. Nobody can know what would have
happened if NATO had not intervened; there is no proof that the bloodbath would occur. The
intervention might have prevented a bloodbath during that time; however, the misuse of the
intervention and the lack of a coherent vision led to a chaos that not only Libya has been
suffering from, but the international community as well.
In addition, the internal politics of the country should have been deeply studied before
taking the decision of the intervention. To explain NATO decided to end its mission with the
death of al Qaddafi, without taking into consideration the fragility of the institutional system
in Libya, which should have been taken into consideration even before the decision of the
intervention was adopted. While fostering the regime change, the international community
did not think about the period after the elimination of Qaddafi, who would step into the
vacuum; by what means, and how should the West facilitate the evolution of the political and
security landscape of the country? Without a clearly thought-out long-term goal, limited
targeted strikes intended to protect civilians flowed seamlessly into regime overthrow.363
The
lack of any planning for Libya’s post-conflict development was a dramatic strategic failure
on the part of NATO and its allies. The policy makers in Washington, London and Paris in
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particular, planned to overthrow Al Qaddafi apparently without any policy in place for how
to unify a dysfunctional post-war state.364There should be a coherent vision for the post
intervention stage, without affecting the sovereignty of the state, based on well-studied inner
politics of the country. In other words, any intervention has to have a clear political strategy
defining the mission’s objectives as well as plans to counteract the undesirable but
foreseeable consequences that are natural by-products of any intervention.365
Finally, aside from all of the above, the inconsistency problem makes the application
of R2P seems fickle and hypocritical, as the international community decide to intervene in
some crisis while neglecting the others; such action reflects that the humanitarian concerns
are not the main driver for intervention and that the humanitarian intervention is to great
extend politicized, controlled and related to the countries self-interest rather than its main
target, which is the protection of civilians under threat. As such, the most important aspect for
the future of the intervention and the concept of the responsibility to protect is to follow a
valid, agreed and settled criteria that are not driven by political considerations and states selfinterest; while having the humanitarian concerns as the main priority and only target.
5.4 Research Limitation:
The inability to conduct interviews in Libya is considered a main problem in this
research. To explain, Libya has been suffering from the lack of security since the outbreak of
the popular uprising in 2011, as such it was extremely difficult to travel there to conduct
interviews with the officials, academics, public, etc.
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